The late Vitaly Vorotnikov, who was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 1983 to 1990, left interesting notes regarding the dramatic events in December 1986 in Kazakhstan.
Renowned political analyst Andrey Chebotarev published excerpts from Vorotnikov’s book «And It Was Like This… From the Diary of a Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU» on his Telegram channel, relating to the then Kazakh SSR period in 1986:
«May 15. Central Committee Politburo. Gorbachev’s information about letters from Kazakhstan: ‘There is a flow of complaints about Kunaev’s improper behavior. He has surrounded himself with fellow countrymen. His people are everywhere. Unbridled praise of his personality. Corruption. Demands for the Central Committee to investigate the situation in the republic. An analysis of the situation in Kazakhstan is necessary.’ He said he gave instructions…
November 20. Central Committee Politburo. Led by M.S. Gorbachev… On the agenda. Gorbachev informed about negative sentiments in Kazakhstan towards D.A. Kunaev, that he is in conflict with N.A. Nazarbayev. ‘We need to think about options for replacing Kunaev’…
December 11. At the Politburo, Gorbachev informed about D.A. Kunaev’s statement. He asks to be relieved of his duties (due to age, health). Mikhail Sergeyevich talked about a conversation with Kunaev, who allegedly negatively characterized N.A. Nazarbayev, believing that the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan should be a Russian. They decided to support the request for resignation, and at Gorbachev’s suggestion, recommend G.V. Kolbin (who worked in Sverdlovsk, Georgia, and is currently the first secretary of the Ulyanovsk regional party committee) to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan…
December 17. Gorbachev called me. He reported that the Plenum in Kazakhstan went smoothly. G.V. Kolbin was elected the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The situation is normal…
December 18. Another Central Committee Politburo meeting. Gorbachev’s information on events on the night of December 18 in Almaty (according to reports from there): ‘A crowd in the square, many young people. Dissatisfaction with the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan on the election of G.V. Kolbin. Hooligan actions. Attempts to provoke purely nationalist manifestations against Russians by student youth. The only response is to block the square. The number of protesters is about 2,500 people. Clashes occurred. There are casualties, including among the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Arson of cars and a store.
During the night, 700 activists were gathered in Almaty, as well as at several enterprises. They called for resistance to negative manifestations and stabilization of the situation. In other regions of the republic, it is relatively calmer. It is determined who leads the ‘uprising,’ mainly from the intelligentsia, party committee employees, television, university professors. Kunaev himself believed that there was no worthy candidate for the post of the first secretary in the republic. But, according to unverified information, the initiators of the protests are his circle. I spoke with Dimash Akhmetovich; he hints that the initiative comes from Prime Minister Nazarbayev (I don’t think so, Gorbachev believes), he, supposedly, was eager for power. Now, on December 18, the square is blocked. But around 1,500 people are there. Crowds are in other areas of the city (about 5,000). They are suggesting the idea of a mass demonstration on Saturday and Sunday.’
After exchanging opinions with Politburo members, we entered the meeting room. Gorbachev briefly outlined the essence of the issue. And he continued: ‘It is necessary to localize the conflict. It is important to avoid harsh measures. But instruct the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Vlasov) to still bring in additional forces. Kunaev is demoralized, uninitiated. The main thing is not to equate negative nationalist manifestations with the Kazakh people. Prepare objective information for the press.’ It was decided to send Solomentsev, Vlasov, and Lushev to Almaty from the Politburo.
In the evening, Gorbachev called me and other Politburo members via the selector. He said, ‘I talked to Kolbin. The situation has improved. There was a conversation with Kunaev – warned about responsibility, asked to intervene in the course of events. I think this will help.’ He read out the text of the message for publication. We agreed.»
In general, information for reflection…»
