Russian oligarch and political activist, Mr. Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, dedicated a post to Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev. In that post, famous Kazakh political observer, Mr. Andrey Chebotaryov, found not as much a realistic assessment of a politician, but willingness to promote own political game.
Literal translation of Mr. Chebotaryov’s post below:
Yesterday, a Russian oppositional politician, Mikhail Khodorkovskiy released in his Telegram-channel a complimentary post, dedicated to the ex-President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev. In particular, the author, highlighted the following:
“Today is Nursultan Nazarbayev’s birthday. For a long time, he was on the well-paved trail of post-Soviet autocracy, but at the last moment, he left it and now keeps a low profile of a retired person;
“Nazarbayev ruled Kazakhstan for almost 30 years. He persecuted political opponents, gave whole economic sectors under the control of relatives, and even attempted to build up a personality cult of his own – rather ridiculous, it should be noted… But all of that looks pale by comparison with one particular fact. Nazarbayev gave up power and went for a reformation of the institutions of state governance, though counting on preservation of influence on the key decisions making processes even after the formal stepping down”;
“One way or another, but Kazakhstan experienced the power transit – the particular thing, that leaders like Putin and Lukashenko fear most…Nazarbayev’s example shows that there can be another way. The big question is what you value most – power or well-being of your Motherland”;
Putin or Nazarbayev?
Mr. Chebotaryov’s observations regarding Khodorkovskiy’s post are as follows:
Judging by all, in this particular case, this one of the most prominent opponents to Kremlin is driven by willingness to contrast Nazarbayev, with whom, Khodorkovskiy had never had any common affairs, with Vladimir Putin, which individual deprived him from freedom, assets and influence in Russia
At the same time, Khodorkovskiy is not in the know of the full information regarding the political life in Kazakhstan, including the balance of forces and the relationships within the circle of the ruling elites.
First of all, the Kazakhstan ex-President is obviously not a person, who would ever care about the “well-being of the Motherland”. Or, to be more accurate, he did care, but to extent corresponding to his personal and family well-being. I think, that even potential co-thinkers of Khodorkovskiy will disagree with that particular statement.
Far more important is, that even after stepping down, Nazarbayev did not lose willingness to proceed to rule. It is just that in the period of 2019-2021, he ruled in a totally different status, but using habitual methods and mechanisms. And in no manner did he “go for a reformation of the institutions of state governance”. It is just that because of some factors, he did not interfere with the transformations directed by the new President of the country, Mr. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Nazarbayev and his loyalists realistically blocked serious political changes.
As to the power transit, the said transit finished in 2022, as a consequence of the January Events and that process definitely was not something and how the ex-President wanted it. There are some arguments, that may put to a supposition that Nazarbayev wanted to perform the Singapore scenario of the power transit, under his control. In other words, the power passes from Father to Son through an inter-mediate (temporary) person in the office.
Within the framework of such a scenario, Tokayev, most likely, finish his presidency in 2024, if not earlier.
Someone from the First Family would make the third President of Kazakhstan, for example Nursultan Nazarbayev’s nephew, Samat Abish. That, however, is a big topic for analysis. In any case, in the last year, Nursultan Nazarbayev lost control of the power transit, as well as the further development of the situation in the country, in general. That said, the process went on, contrary to Nazarbayev, and not to his merit. The only statement out of Khodorkovskiy’s post, we may agree to, is that “Tokayev got rid of mentorship and commenced the process of soft disassembly of the Nazarbayev regime”.
