According to Daniyar Ashimbayev, one of the most critical issues related to the events of January 2022 is the situation surrounding Almaty Airport. On his Telegram channel, the political analyst expressed his opinion on these events:
In the spring of 2021, the airport was finally purchased by a Turkish company. It would be strange if the sale of such a strategic asset was not coordinated with the National Security Committee (KNB) and with the management of «Air Astana,» closely associated with its leadership. But for now, it’s just a coincidence.
Mysterious Flight
On one hand, the security fled on orders from above before the assault. On the other hand, certain «activists,» previously detained for participating in «protests,» were ordered to be released from above, after which they «suddenly» decided to seize the airport. According to their statements in court, their goal was to prevent the arrival of Russian troops.
However, at that time, the decision to invite CSTO forces had not been made, although it may have been discussed in Akorda during meetings involving the leadership of the KNB.
At the same time, a mysterious flight from Osh, Kyrgyzstan, landed at the airport, bringing more than 170 people. There was information that this aircraft had flown private flights to Kazakhstan before.
The arrival of the flight somehow coincided with a sharp intensification of hostilities in the city. It is worth noting that almost all eyewitnesses reported large groups of young people arriving in Almaty over the course of a few days, settling in rented apartments in different parts of the city. They had a sporty build, combat skills, their own communication system, freshly shaved beards, and an accent that some identified as Karakalpak.
Additionally, some veterans of the security forces pointed out that during the assault on government buildings, the attackers clearly demonstrated special forces skills. There was also information that in December, individuals believed to have traveled to Syria appeared in some regions of the country, but no measures were taken by the special services to apprehend them.
It would be challenging to organize all of this solely through the efforts of the KNB without the involvement of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Border Guard Service. However, their leaders were not accused of treason.
Development of Events
Protests began on the 2nd, and a group of negotiators (Tugzhanov, Karin, Bilisbekov) was sent to Aktau. The deployment of National Guard forces commenced (though insufficient nationwide). According to the schedule, protests and disorder quickly erupted across the country, organized informally by individuals associated with Masimov and criminal groups (maneuvers practiced during the 2019 elections and the 2020 Kurday events). The formal aspect was managed by «activists» from the Precinct Election Commission (DVK) structures.
Calls for protests were widely broadcasted by liberal media, channels, and through social networks—by pro-Western and Ukrainian intelligence agencies and propagandists (plus Belarusian «Nekhta»). By the evening of the 4th, the conflict entered an open stage. The KNB and military personnel started disappearing from the scene, and the police received no orders to use firearms. Perhaps for the better: a crucial point in the coup scenario clearly included the «shooting of peaceful protesters,» aiming to turn the «protests» into a «popular uprising.» Ak Orda hesitated, hoping to resolve the situation peacefully.
Conspirators did not wait and began storming government buildings and police stations, seizing weapon stores and arsenals, and beating captured police and military personnel. The image of a «peaceful protest» collapsed before their eyes.
Around the same time, apparently, the «international community» pressured Astana to immediately negotiate with the «rebels,» and the KNB leadership strongly recommended the president to leave Ak Orda, the capital, and the country.
It seems Masimov pressured the president, but the reaction he received wasn’t as expected. The story of Tokayev’s conversation with him in Chinese turned into a meme, and accounts of Nigmatulin supposedly delivering an ultimatum were pure nonsense.
About Masimov and Abish
I vividly remember my last visit to Astana in late December 2021. Some confidently said Smailov would become the prime minister on January 8th. Others mentioned Masimov. They argued that the president wasn’t keen, but there was «no other strong candidate realistically.» I said back then that appointing Masimov as prime minister for the third time would be foolish. His second term didn’t go well, and a third would only highlight a shortage of talent in the country. But apparently, Masimov thought differently.
It’s worth noting that it would have been cheaper to organize an attempt on the president and the Senate speaker’s lives. Then, the functions of the head of state would pass to Prime Minister Mamin or Majilis Speaker Nigmatulin, who also belonged to the «Old Kazakhstan.» But a different option was chosen, indicating that neither of them was considered as allies.
What exactly transpired in Ak Orda between the president and the head of the KNB will likely remain unknown. It’s possible that someone from the leadership of the conspirators leaked crucial information at the last moment.
Early on the morning of the 5th, Tokayev dismissed Mamin and Kushebayev, replacing them with Smailov and Karin (the latter was in Aktau at the time). Another first deputy to Masimov was appointed, the loyalist Murat Nurtleu. In theory, there was only one first deputy in the KNB, Samat Abish, but his resignation happened later. His role in the events remains unclear.
Abish was once also considered a successor, but Nazarbayev didn’t even nominate him for the position of the head of the KNB. According to one source, he leaked information about Masimov; according to another, he was one of the main conspirators. He was not detained but constantly remains in the «investigation’s orbit.»
About Nazarbayev
The situation concerning Nazarbayev raises significant questions. The protests were organized under the slogan «Shal ket!» (which already excludes his involvement in the coup). It would be strange if he wasn’t under pressure as the chairman of the Security Council. Something like, «Look at what your candidate has led the country to, and we warned you…»
The first president writes in his memoirs that on the 5th, he was in Almaty, and Abai Bisembaev took him to the capital because Nazarbayev couldn’t trust his security at that moment. This is a crucial point, indicating maneuvers around the first president, attempting to isolate him in a city where conspirators increased control.
Most likely, the decision to transfer the chairmanship of the Security Council to Tokayev was made at the same time. The decision, understandably, was verbal and symbolic, as the corresponding law was only passed in April. It’s possible the issue was coordinated even before evacuation to prevent the isolation of the first president.
Tokayev quotes conspirators saying they didn’t expect any display of political will from the authorities. The conspirators clearly hoped that the intelligent diplomat Tokayev would break and flee. And with Nazarbayev isolated, a power vacuum would be filled by Masimov.
Western Appeals
All decisions were announced between midnight and one in the morning on January 6th. First, Tokayev declared himself chairman of the Security Council. Half an hour later, during its meeting, he announced that he had turned to the CSTO. Video footage recorded Masimov among the meeting participants, but a few minutes later, it was reported that he was relieved of his position (and later arrested). ErmeK Sagimbayev, the chief of the State Guard Service (SGO), was appointed in his place.
A few hours later, the CSTO announced the dispatch of peacekeepers to Kazakhstan (mainly consisting of Russian airborne troops, redeployed from the Ukrainian border and Belarus).
The situation on the 6th was unclear. The leaders of the conspirators were arrested, peacekeepers rapidly arrived in Almaty, some «foreign specialists» left Kazakhstan, but fighting continued.
On the evening of the 7th, Tokayev announced that «the situation in the cities of Almaty, Aktobe, and Almaty region has stabilized. The introduction of a state of emergency yields results. Constitutional legality is being restored throughout the country. However, terrorists continue to damage state and private property, using weapons against citizens. I have given orders to law enforcement agencies and the army to open fire to kill without warning. Abroad, there are calls for both sides to negotiate for a peaceful resolution. What nonsense! What negotiations can there be with criminals, murderers? We had to deal with armed and prepared bandits, both local and foreign. Exactly with bandits and terrorists. Therefore, they need to be eliminated. And this will be done in the near future.» And it was done.
Why the Airport Takeover Was Needed
By the time peacekeepers arrived, the airport was secured. The arrival of troops with equipment and rumors (or maybe not rumors) that the GRU special forces from Moscow were ready for action became the final chord.
The police, remaining loyal to the president and their oath, arrested Jumageldiev; those detained by the bandits and Masimov’s associates as pseudo-witnesses were released. Against this backdrop, the anticipated «fourth wave,» which was supposed to ensure the final defeat of the authorities and security forces, never materialized.
The most questions surround this «fourth wave.» Information surfaced that extremist cells were preparing her. Logically, if we consider various scenario versions, she should have supposedly confronted the «people’s rebels» together with the «constructive forces» and then establish a «government of popular trust.» It’s not ruled out that there was a consideration for a complete surrender of the southern regions to extremists. This would have ignited Central Asia and the Suar region. Turkish involvement is already hinted at, especially since Ankara reportedly insisted on sending its peacekeepers. Additionally, some well-known leaders of Salafists moved to Turkey before the New Year and could have returned from there in a new capacity. Not to forget that Turkish «partners» actively assisted Kazakh radicals in moving to and from Syria.
This is why control over Almaty Airport was crucial. Russian paratroopers, fully armed and with equipment, arrived just in time. The last forces of the city’s law enforcement managed to repel the assault on the airfield.
However, it’s essential to remember that on the 5th, another mysterious plane arrived in Almaty – a military Il-76 from Moscow, which could have brought in a vanguard (special forces), aiding in clearing the airport. Some familiar security personnel claimed that the plane was actually ours, freshly purchased, and they just didn’t have time to repaint it. They said it transported Interior Ministry special forces as a reserve for the counter-terrorism headquarters in Almaty.
The Goal – Country Division
The president’s warning was clearly directed at those who had not surrendered yet and those who had not taken to the streets.
The deployment of peacekeepers clearly indicated that the city was surrounded, and the balance of forces was not in favor of the «peaceful protesters» and their «bearded friends.»
The latter remained in the shadows. Moreover, control over the National Security Committee (KNB) was fully restored, and the military finally began to follow the orders of Ak Ordа. Perhaps part of the military leadership was not part of the conspirators but was simply bought or influenced by the committee. The relatively lenient decisions regarding the military allow for such a conclusion. The same applies to the border guards. Bektanov and Dilmakov were tried on different charges but given the maximum punishment.
In one way or another, the fourth wave disappeared, and the third was methodically suppressed or arrested.
Western media continued to complain about repression against peaceful protesters, while Russians quickly returned to their previous positions, from where they began military operations against the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) after a few weeks.
In essence, the plan envisaged involving Russia in a protracted conflict in Kazakhstan to provide Kiev with the opportunity to start an «ATO» (Anti-Terrorist Operation) in Donbas following the Karabakh scenario. It’s doubtful that so much effort was expended just for Masimov to come to power. His arrest on the night of January 6th and other actions by Tokayev had already rendered the coup meaningless.
And now, let’s focus on the president’s words about the threat to the country’s territorial integrity and the fact that the maximum terrorist activity occurred in the southern regions. Here, the fourth wave was supposed to operate, backed by foreign «partners.»
It is quite evident that the victory of terrorists in the east (Taldykorgan and Ust-Kamenogorsk) could have led to Chinese intervention, potentially provoking an even sharper conflict (let’s not forget how the Americans actively fueled anti-Chinese sentiments in recent years, playing on Kazakh nationalism and Islamism).
The Coup Was Being Prepared for a Long Time
Throughout 2019-2021, there was active cultivation of anti-Russian sentiments, escalating into overt incitement of interethnic relations. Some individuals persistently attempted to sour relations between Ak Ordа and the Kremlin through regular negative rumors and provocative actions such as «language patrols.»
The administration was genuinely nervous about intelligence information on the threat of separatism, which, as it later turned out, was generated by the intelligence agencies themselves. Recall that in late 2019, Tokayev expressed strong opinions about external interference in Kazakhstan’s internal affairs, and then unexpectedly replaced the leadership of the ideological block, which had a too pro-Western stance. This was enough to categorize him as an obvious «enemy of democracy» who needed to be ousted at any cost.
There were few hopes for a «color revolution» because liberal ideas were not popular among the population, and activists could not come up with anything beyond posters.
The prospect of a «green revolution» was dubious due to the low religiosity of the population and the vigorous work of the intelligence agencies (especially noting that the leaders of KNB units combating terrorism were not involved in the conspiracy).
Therefore, there was an attempt to combine «Zheltoksan» with «Zhanaozen,» working out the mechanism in 2019 and 2020.
