It’s not difficult to notice that in recent years, publications claiming to be oppositional have completely shifted from the topic of corruption scandals in power to issues of political protest and actions of so-called activists, writes political scientist Daniyar Ashimbayev in his Telegram channel.
The theme of corruption was previously so popular for two reasons.
Firstly, most of the opposition leaders left power due to corruption scandals and sought revenge on their former allies.
Secondly, their publications were used by the ruling elites to leak compromising material on each other.
But with the development of new tools like Telegram channels and whistleblower bloggers, the need to outsource the dissemination of leaked materials has disappeared.
Moreover, it became clear that compromising material was mainly of interest to the capital’s circles, while the general population was largely indifferent. Sometime at the end of the last decade, all old and new publications finally switched to the American grid with new canons.
The theme of corruption was not so interesting to the West because the money and assets were in its own jurisdiction, and their confiscation required their return to the homeland, i.e., a reduction of its own feed base.
Issues of social protest were also not in high demand, as the state initially pursued an active social policy, and the problems of «hungry marches» disappeared by the late 90s. The Zhanaozen protestors also quickly bored the West, especially considering the positions of its own oil business in Kazakhstan.
New Vector of Instability
However, the theme of political protest, especially with an anti-Russian and anti-Chinese undertone, is an ideal tool for political pressure on Astana and delegitimizing undesirable political regimes in the eyes of Western public opinion.
The most striking examples are «solidarity with the prisoners of Chinese concentration camps for Kazakhs,» the massive promotion of the themes of «genocide,» «famine,» and the need for urgent «decolonization» of Kazakhstan, «repression» against civil activists (specifically «civil,» not «oppositional» or «democratic»), violations of freedom of speech, rights of religious and sexual minorities (the latter, however, had to be actively implanted).
Why did opposition activists fall out? It’s simple. There is a clear crisis in the Kazakh opposition, related to the lack of adequate leaders and their own ideas. Ak Orda technically intercepts the political agenda, but its own multi-vector position categorically does not satisfy the West, which does not want to be one of the vectors, and not the main one at that. Tokayev cleverly plays on «green energy» and joint extraction of rare earth metals, has liberalized the system, i.e., there is nothing for the EU to criticize.
Sovereign Democracy
The West cannot properly prove systemic violations of the sanctions regime, although I think Astana can easily sacrifice a couple of businessmen and financiers if claims arise.
Kazakhstan publishes economic strategies according to the canons of the World Bank and the IMF (you can’t criticize that), increases the work of the Middle Corridor (as if bypassing Russia, but with Moscow’s participation and in China’s interests), and expands cooperation projects with Russia within the EAEU and directly. Don’t want oil through the CPC? Please, it will go through Russia to Germany.
It is clear that Astana is playing in its own interests, and it is equally clear why the volume of investments in «civil activists» and relevant media has sharply increased.
Ak Orda is understandably annoyed, but it plays quite subtly. Last year’s list of individuals receiving foreign funding (recall the hysteria caused by a similar project of the Georgian authorities), targeted measures to suppress external agendas (ban on the gay parade on March 8, blocking the practice of canceling concerts unpopular with activists, demonstratively psychiatric examination of a «language patrol» activist, refusal of accreditation to the local branch of the American «Voice of Freedom,» etc.) — show that the previous soft attitude will no longer be there.
Tokayev has already mentioned the thesis of «sovereign democracy,» which is based on national, not global interests and values.
Political Provocations
In response, we see the activation of political provocations and their informational support.
In addition, «near-elite» projects related to the activation of the pro-Western wing of part of the business and some former «prisoners of the regime» are recorded. It is not entirely clear whether this is an external project or another game in oligarchic opposition. Let’s see how quickly they start playing the national and religious game, trying to expand the social base and secure external support.
Today, it can be stated that there is no particular internal potential for mass political protest, but active attempts are being made to form it and destabilize Kazakhstan at any cost. In January 2022, such a project already failed — and at a very high price. Astana learned a lesson, but the pressure is augmenting.
