William Marx Mandel, a US 20^th century left-wing activist, broadcaster, Sovietologist and Orientalist published an article going under the name Soviet Central Asia in The Pacific Affairs Magazine in 1942.  We have published a two-part exposition of Mandel’s thoughts about Russian imperialistic colonialism in the discussed region (How Russian Tzar Colonized Central Asia Peoples, Parts 1 and 2).  Below is an exposition of his observation of the socialist expansion in Central Asia.

The Strategy of ‘Soft Power’

Most astoundingly, the Soviets, four years subsequent to the revolution, refrained from intervening in the local feudal structure. More precisely, they did not endeavor to alter the system of land and water distribution.

This state of affairs remained unaltered during the first two years, a period when power in the region was held by local communists. The situation persisted unchanged even during the following two years, even after the visit to Tashkent in 1919 by the legendary leaders of the revolution — Lazar Kaganovich, a member of the All-Russian Military Revolutionary Committee, the esteemed military leader Mikhail Frunze, and Valerian Kuibyshev.

The reason for this was the enduring strength of the power of the beys and mullahs. The very idea of expropriating land from a bey, or worse, from a mosque, was utterly alien to the indigenous inhabitants. It was perceived as equally immoral as the actions once undertaken by the Tsarist administration. Moreover, the nature of local life was not simply feudal; it was patriarchal. That is, the beys, beks, and mullahs were seen as kinfolk by the native populace — emerging from the same clans, tribes, and families. Therefore, the Bolsheviks’ primary task was to undertake preparatory work in the realm of democracy.

The Confrontation of the Elites

On the other hand, the hopes of the nationalist bourgeoisie, owners of large landholdings and cotton processing factories, dissipated like smoke. They had anticipated unfettered capitalist development, a cause for which many were prepared to fight armed.

These elitists, educated and informed about events in the European part of Russia, as well as the Bolsheviks’ plans to build socialism, formed bands. The Basmachi terrorized the region until 1931, controlling significant territories until 1921.

However, those among them who recognized the futility of open confrontation preferred to formally switch sides to the new authority. Their objective was to organize resistance from within the system. They managed to survive until 1936-1938 before being exposed and ultimately purged from the Bolshevik ranks.

In Kazakhstan, the Soviets’ entry was comparatively straightforward. Proximity to the centers of opposing forces — the Reds and the Whites — compelled the Kazakhs to make their choice.

They joined the ranks of the rebels fighting against the White general Kolchak. And by placing demands on their own national bourgeoisie, clan elders, and tribal leaders, they forced the latter to seek refuge under the wing of the Whites.

n the Kazakh steppe, the lines of confrontation were distinctly drawn. Similarly, in the plowed lands of Central Asia, the Bolsheviks initially did not disturb the centuries-old social order in Kazakhstan.

Even after their final victory, the Soviets for some time did not persecute the participants and leaders of the nationalist movement.

The Young Khivans

The last bastions of feudalism in the region were the so-called «native states,» namely the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara.

They endured longer than other formations in Central Asia due to their special statuses as «native states» left over from the Tsarist empire. Being such, they suffered the least from various interventions in their economy and life by the Tsarist administration.

In this particular case, the Bolsheviks’ policy of non-interference bore fruit. A group of nationalist intellectuals, «The Young Khivans,» emerged.

Having studied the experiences of 1918-1919, they concluded that absolute independence was a fiction. Accordingly, avoiding cooperation with the Bolsheviks would lead to either the Whites or foreign interveners, or both, overthrowing Khiva. ‘The Young Khivans’ began to identify themselves as Bolsheviks, promoters of democracy and self-determination in the form then being implemented in the region. But in reality, they desired that after the overthrow of feudalism, the Bolshevik policy would become more hands-off and not interfere with private enterprise.

The Khivan Bolsheviks successfully rallied the local population against Khan Turkmen, who had previously conquered the Khivan Khanate, overthrowing the native Khivan Khan. They organized a revolt against the Khan, forced him to retreat, and established their revolutionary government centered in Khorezm.

The last was the Emirate of Bukhara, from which, after a failed attempt to overthrow their Emir in Tashkent, local nationalist intellectuals fled to the Bolsheviks. With the support of the Tashkent Revolutionary Military Council, they stirred up the poorest strata of Bukhara’s population against the Emir. By this time, neighboring regions had already witnessed numerous benefits from Bolshevik rule. The lives of peasants improved, and natives held responsible positions in the state apparatus. By the end of August 1920, a series of uprisings flared up in the Emirate, and the Emir was overthrown. But the city itself resisted fiercely and was taken only with the support of the Red Army.

Soviet, But Not Socialist

The new state formations with centers in Khorezm and Bukhara were unique phenomena within the system. They declared themselves Soviet, but not socialist republics. In both cases, the local governments, the Councils of People’s Commissars, were entirely staffed by representatives of the local indigenous population. They were granted complete independence in matters of internal policy. On March 4, 1921, the RSFSR and the Bukharan Soviet Republic signed an agreement. According to this document, Russia recognized the full independence of Bukhara and its right to self-governance.

The non-socialist nature of Bukhara became evident from the very first political and economic measures of the government. Indeed, the new authority deprived the wealthiest people, the clergy, and officials of the Emir’s administration of their voting rights, confiscated their property, and abolished old taxes.

To control trade intermediation and the import of foreign goods, the local government established a state monopoly on the purchase and sale of agricultural products and organized supplies to Russia. Representatives of the overthrown classes conducted secret subversive activities, resisting every initiative of the new authority. They massively joined the Bolshevik party and successfully infiltrated responsible positions in government bodies.

The End of Basmachism

Simultaneously, in 1921-1922, the Basmachi received a new wave of reinforcements from those who feared reprisals from the new authority. They were led by the adventurer Enver Pasha, who achieved temporary consolidation of anti-Soviet forces under the banner of building a separate pan-Islamic state. He skillfully played on the sentiments of the native population, suffering from Tsarism in the past and from numerous oversights and mistakes of the new authority in the present.

Nonetheless, by 1921, when Enver Pasha made his bid for power in the region, the Soviet government became more active. It decided that it had already earned sufficient support from the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. By that time, these peoples were more under the control of the Bolsheviks than other peoples of Turkestan. And the Soviets finally decided to start reforming land management — in essence, the eradication of feudalism.

The lands of the beys and mosques were divided among the poorest dehkans. Where the Tsarist administration had given land to Russian kulaks, the Bolsheviks confiscated it and returned it to its original indigenous owners. Although Bukhara, Khorezm, and even Turkestan were not quite ready for such changes, this measure struck a severe blow to Enver Pasha’s plans. Because now the lines between the main mass of the working population and the handful of beys and mullahs were physically delineated.

Loyalty Within Two Years

Meanwhile, the new authority energetically transformed Bukhara with its social and economic life. In 1922, the party conducted a purge of its ranks from representatives of the ruling classes or their agents. Measures were also taken to increase trade turnover and the areas of arable land. These two indicators had decreased by two-thirds during the years of the civil war. The Bolsheviks also created a new state apparatus, restored irrigation channels, roads, and other communications and infrastructure.

In 1923, Bukhara allocated 25% of its revenues to education, fundamentally breaking the veil of centuries of mass illiteracy. In fulfillment of the terms of the 1921 treaty, the RSFSR sent over 150 doctors and 154 nurses to Bukhara. By 1923, trade unions, previously unknown, gathered 12,000 people in their ranks. They created the Union of Dehkans, convincing ordinary people that the goals and tasks of the new authority and new form of union were entirely different from those of the wealthy classes. As a result of such policies, the Basmachi, who had counted on the support or neutrality of the local indigenous population, became the objects of persecution and censure by the same population.

By 1924, the Bolsheviks had doubled the area of land under cotton, as during the civil war years, when the connection with Russia was disrupted, some of the lands began to be sown with grain. Beginnings of Independence

With the improvement of the economy, education also developed parallelly. There was an increase in the involvement of the indigenous population in management processes and public life. This led to a rise in national consciousness. Previously, the indigenous population demanded an end to Russian domination. Now, each people demanded their own national state. The existing boundaries were based on naturally demarcated territories, taking into account past conquests and arbitrary redistribution of subordination under the Tsarist administration.

In 1923, separate congresses of deputies of the Kyrgyz, Kazakh, and Turkmen peoples were held. They gathered representatives of the republics where Uzbeks ethnically dominated. These congresses, as well as similar events in Turkestan, sent a clear message about the desire of each people of Central Asia to have their own national republic. The problem was solved in 1924 when the principle of 1917 was applied — each people would determine their own borders. The delimitation of territories became possible thanks to economic and social progress in Bukhara and Khorezm. The growth in self-awareness of the peoples who chose the socialist path of development also played a role. It was they who prepared the ground for entering into a new state formation — the USSR.

Gaining Independence

The All-Bukharan Congress of 1924 proclaimed the republic socialist and went further. The main territories inhabited by Uzbeks were unified with the lands of the Uzbeks of Turkestan into a single Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). This triggered a chain reaction – the Pamir mountain areas, predominantly inhabited by Tajiks, united into a Tajik autonomy. This became part of the Uzbek SSR. Later, the autonomy merged with the Transcaspian region, resulting in the Turkmen SSR.

Thus, the multinational native states of Bukhara and Khorezm disappeared from the world map. In their place appeared the Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs, as well as the Autonomous Turkestan Republic.

Two years later, Turkestan was divided into the Kazakh and Kyrgyz Autonomous Republics.

In 1931, the Tajiks, who constituted the autonomy within the Uzbek SSR, were separated from this republic into a separate Soviet Socialist Republic. It became the seventh union republic of the USSR.

In 1936, the Kazakh and Kyrgyz autonomies were transformed into separate SSRs. By this time, the nomadic peoples of the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz had been settled.

Until the creation of the republics, the new authority was unable to completely separate the dehkans from the beys. Feudal clan leaders fueled interethnic enmity and hatred. Nationalist intellectuals also worked in this direction. The delimitation of borders between peoples secured support for the government’s actions in Moscow. These measures allowed the peoples to focus on their own affairs. In other words, to pay attention to their rich inner world, rather than relations with neighbors.

The End of Feudalism

In the new circumstances, the forefront was taken by ‘Koshchi’ — the Union of Dehkans. Emerging in 1919 in Turkestan, this movement gradually encompassed the entire Central Asian region.

Its organizers played on the sentiments of the rural poor. They united the dehkans against the owners of large arable territories. However, this was not about redistributing property rights. These were more long-term plans. The poor were more convinced that the landowners deliberately prevented the plowing and sowing of lands.

The Union of Dehkans also advocated for national equality. Thus, ultimately, it contributed to the creation of new national socialist states. Later, the issue of staffing the bodies overseeing agriculture arose. Representatives of ‘Koshchi’ were promoted to these positions, which enhanced their prestige in the eyes of the local population.

Now, when people’s attention was freed from the remnants of the past in the form of disputes with neighboring peoples, the Communist Party, the government, and ‘Koshchi’ decided that the time had come to finally resolve the issue of overthrowing feudalism in the economy. In other spheres of life, Soviet power already confidently predominated by this time.

Land to the People

An American who personally witnessed the process of establishing socialism in Central Asian agriculture said: “…The first step is the unification into a union of workers and tenants (i.e., Koshchi.) Then propaganda of the Soviet land legislation is conducted among the masses, along with explanatory work. People are informed that the authorities want the land to be owned by those who directly labor on it. When the party believes that the people are bold enough and united, legal expropriation follows…”

The result depended on the strength of the dehkans in the local areas. No records were kept to establish boundaries between allotments and plots. Therefore, owners could always fight back — either with the help of Basmachi, if they were nearby, or by taking revenge on the dehkans later – after the Bolsheviks moved on to new areas for expropriation.

The nationalization of land began in 1925 in Tashkent, Samarkand, and Fergana, and it was completed in 1929 in Tajikistan, on the border with Afghanistan. The land ownership reform was as bloody as the process of creating new socialist republics was peaceful. This same reform caused fundamental changes in the life of the peoples of this part of the world. The nationalization of the land was accompanied by the emergence of a clearly defined political life of the dehkans themselves.

They realized that the land truly belonged to them. Moreover, the historical absence of an official land registry became an argument in their favor. Economic changes led to a reevaluation of attitudes towards religion and everyday life. For the first time in history, women uncovered their faces.

Gender Weapon

The emancipation of women became the first real blow to the old life in Central Asia. The subjugation of women in the old society was not only socio-moral but also economic. They worked with silk, but the final product was always sold by men, who kept the sales proceeds for themselves.

The Bolsheviks fully spun the development of the cotton industry. They bought cotton directly from the women who produced this raw material. Thus, the very root of the local system of relations was cut. Women were shown the path to economic independence from the slavery of their husbands.

The progress that followed the land restructuring was surprisingly rapid. When collectivization began in 1930-31, Central Asia (CA) underwent it simultaneously with other parts of the USSR. As everywhere, the population appreciated the advantages of mechanized agriculture. However, it was financially accessible only to groups of workers. Moreover, the government’s policy was built on providing any assistance to those who worked the land collectively. Additionally, working groups had tax benefits. Therefore, the emergence of collective farms in Central Asia was not a problem for the Soviets.

Focus on Industry

Meanwhile, the Soviet government was pushing another project. Without it, as Stalin believed, achieving true, not just formal, equality in the region remained a fiction.

The USSR government directed colossal financial flows into the new formations. The money went into the development of industry. This allowed producing as much product for the population as was produced in the European part of Russia.

Where the Tsarist government blindly refused to grant permission for the construction of cotton-processing and textile factories that could compete with those in Moscow, the Soviet government did the exact opposite. Through industrialization, the Soviets created a new layer of society — the class of wage workers. These were groups of people accepting the policy of the party and the government. The Soviet government had the opportunity to cultivate loyal promoters to responsible positions.

The success of the Bolsheviks in Asia was most vividly manifested in the ongoing war (1941-1945 — ed. note). Moscow today stands and fights thanks to the heroism of General Panfilov’s division, formed from representatives of the peoples of Central Asia. Those who in 1916 resisted the Tsar’s conscription with weapons in hand, in 1941 went to death for Moscow.

Twenty-eight people held the highway with grenades and Molotov cocktails. They destroyed 56 tanks and prevented the Germans from breaking through to Moscow. They all perished, but Moscow — the symbol of their new life — stood firm. No one entered the capital of the USSR along the Volokolamsk Highway. Nor by other roads.