At present, when they discuss the Russo-Ukrainian confrontation, they talk about not as much the course of the war itself, but the probability of some agreements, in the nearest future, that would end the acute form of the conflict. Those talks are taking place, mainly because the Ukrainian counter-offensive is not that successful. Russians are still holding their positions in the South of Ukraine, while trying to run offensives in the East, in the vicinity of Svatovo and Kremennaya.

This war it turning into a positional confrontation, almost likewise it was during the WWI. Belligerent sides are not breaking through, like it was in fall 2022, when Ukrainians were advancing in the Kharkiv region. In the result of that, they both are furiously fighting to just stand their ground. Their clinching each other, if to use boxing terminology.  They are still capable of returning impacts, but are no longer capable of breaking the situation. 

Given the above, all those concerned are now discussing certain agreements, by which, the fighting countries will at least “freeze the conflict”, if not establish peace. Among known discussions is the 12-point peace plan put forward by China, which plan envisions immediate ceasefire, which means Russia’s control of territories under Russian occupation, which circumstance is not acceptable to Ukraine. The first point in that Chinese plan states necessity to observe the principle of territorial integrity, as follows from the UN Charter, which circumstance, in its turn, is not acceptable to Russia, in which country leaders declare that they want to keep all territories, documented in the Russia Constitution, which means, Russia will keep control over Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhian and Kherson Oblasts. As a minimum, they agree to maintain the status-quo all along the line of contact, although that is not voiced publicly. 

Among the new tendencies, we can separately discuss the 5-6 August summit in the Saudi Arabia, where 40 countries discussed peace plan put forward by Vladimir Zelenskiy. Characteristic is the fact, that Russia was not invited to attend that summit. Illustrative is the fact, that in the said summit there were countries of the West and countries of BRICS less “R”. China, as well, attended that summit. Such an unhabitual format of the said international rally indicates at a certain level of fatigue that the world’s leading countries experience now, in connection with the ongoing conflict and at concealed demonstration of discontent with the position of Russia.

May be, that was the sense behind the summit.  World’s leading countries, including India, China and other countries of the global South wanted to express their attitude to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and that attitude is obviously not in favor of Russia. At the same time, that means that Zelenskiy’s peace plan, as well, is not something to be successfully and fully implemented. 

Ukraine put forward a 10-point peace plan in the Saudi Arabia. By the plan, Russia is supposed to withdraw troops from Ukraine, justice must be restored, meaning reparations and international litigations, and territorial integrity, as per the UN Charter, must be observed. Territorial integrity means Donbas and Crimea back in Ukraine.

At present, Ukraine’s plan is not realistic. But it was voiced in the course of a rather solid event, although no communique was produced in the outcome of that event. Important is the fact, that China expressed readiness to further take part in discussions. In present situation, China’s position is of great significance to Russia. China is the only country now that, hypothetically, both obviously and not, is capable of supporting Russia, at least, in economy. 

In 2023, the Russo-Chinese trade grew by 36% and totaled USD 134 billion. Chinese exports to Russia increased by 73.4% and totaled USD 62.5 billion. The import increased by 15.1% and totaled USD 71.5 billion only.  At the same time, the total Chinese exports in 2022 decreased by 14.5%.  Exports to the USA decreased by 23.1%, to the EU – by 20.6%, to ASEAN – by 21.4%.  That is a sensitive drop down for the economy of China, especially when it comes to exports to industrially developed countries.

In theory, exports to Russia can make up for losses of other markets, but we must take in account the quality and the structure of demand.  Industrially developed markets are more important than Russia.  Because of investments made in the past, as well as technologies coming with those investments, Chinese industrial sector is very sensitive to Western sanctions.  That is why, China is not capable of replenishing all Russian demands, including equipment.

Given the above, the most beneficial outcome for China would be the end of the war.  This war strongly disbalances the global trade.  Besides, the export-oriented Chinese economy deems it of critical importance, that the global economy be restored, as soon as possible, thus triggering the restoration of the demand in the light of globalization. 

Another important aspect is associated with the military side of the war.  Russia suffers from shortages in arms and ordnance.  They in Kremlin definitely counted not that the war would be that intensive and lengthy.  That is why, for Russia of utmost importance is the possibility to buy arms and ordnance.  In July, Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu visited North Korea, where he, most likely, found interest in buying artillery and arty rounds.  North Korea maintains the tradition of having extensive stocks of artillery and arty ordnance.  The Northern Korean armed forces dispose of 10 thousand cannons.  Military specialists think, that Northern Korea is capable of manufacturing some 3,000 cannons a year.  Organizing heavy artillery manufacturing in Russia is a problem, because there are not many plants left for that.  That is why, Russia uses recommissioned T-54s, as field arty.

Given the above, it would be beneficial for Russia to receive arty from the North Korea in exchange to food, for example.  The caliber is compatible.  But, the supplies are of low probability without the consent from China.  North Korea depends on China and shall not risk relations with it.

Given the above, it appears unquestionable that China’s position is very important to Russia.  In many instances, that is the reason, why potential use of nuclear weapons issue almost disappeared from Russian rhetoric, except of marginal Russian propaganda activists.   Because, for China, any use of nuclear weapons even threats to do so are risks posed to global trade.  Even if China is not involved in a rather hypothetical, but still a nuclear conflict, China may lose all consumer markets.  That is why, it is clear why China will strive to end this prolonged conflict, as China deems it.

Given the dead-end situation in the front, it is becoming more and more obvious that leading countries will try to end the conflict.   This summer, there were talks about USA’s informal negotiations with Russia.  Eventually, Matthew Miller of the USA made an impelled public statement on the 3^rd of August, communicating absence of such negotiations.  Demonstrative is the fact, that States had at all to make such a statement.  Of course, we could refer to a proverb, by which there is no smoke without the fire.  More important is the fact that for the USA and Russia, as well, publicity of their contacts in regards to Ukraine is not beneficial.  The confronting sides have way too contrary positions and it is unclear now, how possible is their closeness. 

Quest for some kind of a compromise of course is a part of present agenda.  Interesting is the presence of the Grain Deal in all peace plans declared both by Ukraine and China.  Not only because the stoppage of shipment of grain from the Black Sea region threatens the global food markets.  More importantly, the actual point is the possibility of a phased settlement process. This is when you can start from one item and proceed down the list. Some particularly sensitive ones can be left for a certain period of time. By the way, the grain deal is now being viewed on as a potential discussion topic for the upcoming negotiations between presidents of Russia, Vladimir Putin, and Turkey, Erdogan. The likelihood of the deal being revived in one form or another is quite high. But if this happens in the near future, it turns out that the peaceful plans put forward by Ukraine and China may be implemented partially.

So, it will be possible to talk about the phased implementation of these plans. For example, first of all, the grain deal, then the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant and its transfer are points of the Ukrainian plan. Then there might be a ceasefire and so on. At the same time, individual points of this plan may be deferred in time for a certain perspective, — for instance, the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

In this case, the crucial aspect is the acknowledgment of Ukraine’s territorial integrity itself. Although no official communiqué was adopted in Jeddah, nevertheless, summit participants inherently agreed with this principle. Moreover, China in its plan also speaks about territorial integrity. If we set aside the question of the ownership of certain Ukrainian territories for the sake of a potential negotiation process, yet simultaneously agreeing with the idea of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, it will open up possibilities for certain communications and the realization of all other points.

From the formal standpoint, the above will not satisfy Ukraine, and its representatives indicated that many times.  However, it’s evident that they cannot ignore the increased dependency on support from Western countries through military supplies and financial aid. President of the United States, Joe Biden, has requested an additional sum of $24 billion from the US Congress for Ukraine. Sustaining the active phase of the war demands significant resources, and nearly all of these resources currently come from Western countries. These supplies assist Ukraine in maintaining a technological advantage on the battlefield, but not to the extent that they would have the capability to defeat the Russian army entirely.

For instance, in the fall, Ukraine is supposed to receive 30 «Abrams» tanks. This isn’t a significant number; it’s just one tank battalion. The United States has approximately 3,500 of these tanks in storage and another 2,500 in service. Additional 30 tanks will come from the «Rheinmetall» corporation. Its representatives purchased 50 old «Leopard-1» tanks from Belgium and, after slight modernization, they are to be sent to Ukraine. In theory, the Americans could have supplied 300 tanks, which would have altered the situation. However, deliveries of F-16 fighter-bombers have effectively been postponed until the fall of 2024 due to the need for crew training. In Ukraine, this delay has been criticized as prolonging the matter.

On August 11th, the German government stated that the previously discussed issue of supplying «Taurus» cruise missiles with a range of 500 km and a warhead weight of 500 kg is not currently under consideration. Similarly, the United States has not yet provided the «ATACMS» missiles with a range of 500 km for the «Himars» complexes.

The logic of Ukraine’s Western allies is quite understandable. Initially, they didn’t expect the Ukrainians to hold on at all. Now they see that a quick victory is not anticipated. Consequently, it can be expected that the conflict will enter a protracted stage. For example, it might continue until the American elections in the fall of 2024. This situation leaves the American establishment in a generally vulnerable position.

This is because the war in Ukraine and expenses, associated with it, will inevitably become a subject of discussions during the pre-election campaign. While former President Donald Trump generally holds conditional isolationist position, he could easily win the Republican Party’s primaries by outpacing his competitors. Then, in the actual elections, he would face the Democratic candidate, Biden. Apart from the obvious challenges due to age, Biden is currently embroiled in a serious scandal related to his son Hunter Biden’s not-so-legitimate lobbying activities. Even Kazakhstan has been referred to in this scandal. One of the former politicians from Kazakhstan organized a meeting with his father, when Joe Biden was the Vice President under Barack Obama.

Certainly, the American establishment shares common positions on the international agenda. However, the factor of Trump cannot fail to concern them. In any case, many within the U.S. elite would like to see at least the acute phase of the conflict come to an end. This is partly because Russia’s positions have significantly weakened, and concluding the armed confrontation would leave Russia with an economy in a state of stagnation, along with ongoing sanctions. Accordingly, among Russia’s medium-term objectives, there will be an effort to eventually lift at least some of the sanctions. Naturally, this presents significant opportunities for the West, as Moscow would find itself in a position of the one seeking concessions.

In such a situation, the Western policymakers might not be entirely focused on Ukraine’s aspiration for a complete military defeat of Russia and the recovery of all territories. What matters most to them is that Russia finds itself in a state of gradual resource depletion. Over the long term, this significantly constrains its capabilities but doesn’t corner it completely. In this sense, the current Russian elite is more preferable for the West than ideologically motivated imperialists and proponents of a shift towards a mobilization economy. Among the latter, there is a wide spectrum of figures ranging from Igor Strelkov to Yevgeny Prigozhin, and from Alexander Dugin to Sergei Glazyev.

Hence, freezing the conflict for now and engaging in negotiations later appears to be a reasonable alternative to an open military confrontation. Naturally, this approach doesn’t contribute to the escalation of military support for Ukraine. Support is provided to Ukraine only to the extent necessary to keep Russia on edge but not to lead to a significant defeat. This is because an animal wounded too severely might react dangerously.

As a result, Ukraine finds itself in a rather complex situation. The goals it set for itself, aiming to restore its borders to the 1991 status, seem somewhat difficult to achieve. Ukrainians are heavily reliant on external support, which might not be on a scale sufficient to attain their set objectives.

That’s why the rhetoric from the Ukrainian side is gradually evolving. On one hand, there’s restrained criticism directed towards allies or partners, suggesting they aren’t providing enough weaponry. On the other hand, there’s an increasing mention of the challenges faced in waging a war against a well-prepared defense. Among the emerging trends, one notable thesis recently expressed is the possibility of Russia mobilizing an additional 500,000 personnel and using artillery and drones to wear down the Ukrainian army in its offensive attempts.

This is because the Ukrainian authorities need to explain potential scenarios to their own society. Accordingly, they need to adjust the objectives they’ve set. If the discussion turns toward the phased implementation of one of the peace plans, the likelihood of halting open military confrontation becomes almost inevitable. Any suspension of the conflict, in turn, leads to its freezing. Freezing implies the initiation of some form of consultations, if not negotiations.

At the same time, Ukraine is refraining from negotiations with Russia until all territories are liberated. In this context, it’s logical to assume that these negotiations will eventually be conducted by the Americans, even if they currently deny the possibility. If we consider returning to the times of the Cold War, then secretive negotiations are also natural in such a context. For example, during World War II, negotiations were carried out through influential intermediaries. The Soviet Union held behind-the-scenes talks with Finland about its exit from the war through the mediation of Ambassador Alexandra Kollontai in Sweden. Simultaneously, the anti-Hitler opposition within the German army conducted secret negotiations through the Swedes with the United States and the United Kingdom. Among other things, they demanded that Germany retain the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia.

It’s worth noting that for Ukraine, potentially the most challenging aspect could be related to the ideas of holding referendums, which are frequently discussed in the American press. Interestingly, in August, the newspaper New Times, which is published in Russian but is funded by the U.S., also wrote about this topic. Such framing of the issue will likely find support in Russia as they could easily count on votes from their supporters in Crimea and the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Certainly, Ukraine has its arguments against this approach. In Crimea, after 2014, many new residents from Russia arrived. Many pro-Ukrainian citizens fled from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. As a result of the fighting, many areas have been depopulated, and it’s unclear how to organize a referendum. Additionally, for a relatively fair vote, some form of external involvement would be necessary.

Another factor could be related to the relatively homogenous political environment in Ukraine today. In the sense that there are no major pro-Russian political parties, and their former electorate is disoriented. To what extent could the hypothetical possibility of a significant portion of the Ukrainian electorate orienting towards Russia be advantageous, even in the distant future? Perhaps it would be more beneficial for Ukraine if this occurred somewhat later. For example, when at least partial plans for Ukraine’s recovery within the framework of a post-war «Marshall Plan» analog for Europe’s reconstruction are realized. An important part of this process involves strengthening European institutions within Ukraine. So, while the formally opposing sides have fairly uncompromising attitudes, there is gradually forming a certain logic to move away from the acute phase of armed confrontation. But before this process starts, the point of contact should be established, where the freezing of this conflict might actually occur.

Indeed, such a line should be relatively stable to make it easier to defend and thereby reduce the risk of tempting the opponent to transition into an offensive mode all of a sudden. For instance, a scenario similar to what happened with the Republic of Serbian Krajina in Croatia could be averted. During the breakup of Yugoslavia, local Serbian communities, with support from the Yugoslav army, separated from Croatia, compelling a large portion of local Croats and Muslims (up to 45% of the population, around 200,000 people) to leave the occupied territory. However, the situation of the Serbs from a military-strategic standpoint was quite vulnerable. A narrow strip of land stretched along Croatia’s entire border with Yugoslavia and Bosnia. Some parts of Serbian Krajina were isolated from its main territory. In 1995, the Croatian army defeated the Serbs during the «Operation Storm» and «Operation Flash.» As a result, up to 250,000 Serbs fled from Serbian Krajina.

The current line of confrontation in southern Ukraine indeed appears to be somewhat fragile, despite the Russian defense currently holding. Defending such a vast territory, stretching from Kinburn Awry to the borders of Donetsk Oblast, requires deploying a substantial number of troops along the frontlines. However, the most challenging aspect lies in ensuring their sustenance. Moreover, the main supply of the Russian grouping is facilitated through Crimea. At the moment, Ukraine is targeting the communication lines on the Crimean isthmuses. Additionally, the Crimean Bridge has suffered damage. The recent strikes by Ukrainian naval drones against the large landing ship «Olenegorsk Miner» in Novorossiysk and the tanker «Sig» in the Kerch Strait will undoubtedly impact the maritime deliveries to Crimea.

Supplying the troops positioned north of Crimea does indeed represent a vulnerability for the Russian grouping. Conversely, in Luhansk Oblast, the Russian army faces fewer issues with logistics. Here, they can utilize the railway network, which eases the transportation of goods. Moreover, in Russia, the railway infrastructure for military supplies is traditionally more developed, with road transport playing a lesser role. As a result, the Russian army has concentrated a larger troop presence near Kremennaya and Svatovo and is launching attacks on Ukrainian positions to alleviate pressure on their southern grouping.

Indeed, launching an offensive in the region around Kremennaya, Svatovo, and Kupyansk is challenging due to the terrain. For instance, the town of Kupyansk is crossed by the Oskol River, and if the eastern part of the town were to be captured, the higher right bank would have to be stormed. Additionally, it might seem logical to relocate some troops from the east to the southern front in order to counter the Ukrainian offensive. However, moving additional forces north of Crimea would increase the strain on the supply system for the entire southern grouping.

Certainly, reinforcement is clearly needed, not just because it appears that the Ukrainians have approached the main defensive line. A more complex situation is unfolding on the left bank of the Dnipro River. Here, the Ukrainians have already established several bridgeheads, such as near the Antonov Bridge. With the relatively limited presence of Russian forces on the left bank and significant losses in artillery due to counter-battery fire from the Ukrainian right bank, any bridgehead becomes potentially hazardous. After all, the front line is too extensive, and the forces are too thinly spread.

It’s quite possible that the Ukrainian army is planning to combine a crossing of the Dnipro River with a breakthrough on the main defensive line in Zaporizhia. In such a scenario, Russian reserves would have to choose where to advance. In October 1920, the simultaneous attack by the Red Army from the bridgehead near Kherson and from under Nikopol shattered the entire front of the White Army in Northern Tavriia.

Of course, back then the forces were vastly different. Today, the sides are more evenly matched. However, the Russian army is defending in an unfavorable strategic position, much like the Whites in 1920, and is forced to stretch its limited forces along an extensive front line. Even with a balance of forces, this places the Russian army in a vulnerable position. A similar situation occurred last year near Kherson.

Certainly, the immediate course of events on the frontline is in the fog of war. However, it’s evident that the vulnerability of the Russian army’s southern grouping is quite high. This holds true for both the current active phase of the conflict and potential future developments if the parties unexpectedly engage in contacts. Paradoxically, Russia’s positions would become more stable if the frontline were suddenly shortened. For instance, if Russian forces were to unexpectedly withdraw to Crimea.

It’s worth noting that during the Korean War of 1950-1953, North Korean forces initially advanced as far south as the port of Pusan. Then, under pressure from South Koreans and Americans, they retreated up to the border between China and Korea. Following the intervention of Chinese volunteers, the South Korean and US forces were pushed back to the south. Eventually, the border was established almost along the same line (the 38th parallel) that it had occupied before the war.

In this sense, a withdrawal of the Russian army to the Crimean isthmuses would almost bring the situation back to the original positions of 2015, from which Russia began its offensive in 2022. This could be seen as a Ukrainian-Russian equivalent of the 38th parallel. It’s clear that regaining control of cities like Kramatorsk and Lysychansk would be more challenging. But this is likely to become a subject of future negotiations.

Institute of Asian studies