Sultan Akimbekov

At the moment, there is very complex maneuvering around the Russian-Ukrainian war on various fronts, as well as at the levels of internal and external politics. On one hand, a lot of diverse information is emerging regarding the prospects of this war or the lack thereof. On the other hand, there have been quite a few changes in the nature of military actions in recent months, which affect these same prospects. Overall, the situation is very uncertain and leaves many questions.

For example, how stable is Ukrainian defense in the face of the ongoing Russian offensive? Can Ukraine cope if it does not receive weapons and ammunition from the USA, where there is still an internal political struggle around funding for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan? Will supplies from Europe and existing domestic production be enough for Ukraine? Can Ukraine mobilize enough soldiers to strengthen its defense in a situation where Russia may call up to 300,000 soldiers by the beginning of June, as President Volodymyr Zelensky said on April 6, and go on the offensive?

Division Scenario

In this regard, it is characteristic that on April 3, the American publication Politico, citing anonymous Ukrainian military sources, wrote that the defense could collapse if a new large-scale Russian offensive begins in the summer. This raises the question of whether such publications can be considered a form of pressure on official Kyiv, which always says that it is not ready to negotiate without solving the main task – returning to the borders of 1991.

Then another question arises: how likely is the scenario that the Italian newspaper La Repubblica wrote about on April 5? The journalists of the publication suggested that it is possible for Ukraine to join NATO in exchange for recognizing its occupied territories as part of Russia. They drew an analogy with the division of Germany after World War II, when the eastern part came under the control of the USSR, and the western part joined NATO and its defense was strengthened by members of this alliance. Moreover, among the arguments was also the expectation of a possible victory of Donald Trump in the November elections. It is highly likely that such a territory exchange option in the spirit of the Cold War might be quite logical for him.

At the same time, if Ukraine does not agree with such a scenario, can the USA and Europe then exert pressure behind the scenes on the Ukrainian leadership? In particular, on March 31, President Zelensky in an interview with The Washington Post said that «the US reaction to this (strikes of Ukrainian drones on Russian oil refineries) was not positive.»

On one hand, this gives the USA an opportunity to declare that they do not support such decisions of Ukraine. This is significant in terms of not wanting to further deteriorate their relations with Russia. On the other hand, this also reflects to some extent the existing contradictions between the USA and Ukraine.

Here one can draw an analogy with the development of relations between the USA and Israel over the Gaza Strip. After the death of several foreign workers of a humanitarian organization, including one American, as a result of strikes by the Israeli army, US President Joe Biden spoke with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on April 4. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken after this conversation stated that «if we do not see the changes we need to see, then there will be changes in our own policy.» It’s evident that the incident with the death of workers of a humanitarian organization in Gaza was a reason to put pressure on the authorities of Israel. But it’s also clear that the USA will continue to support it, including with arms supplies, but at the same time, they want to push for more pragmatic solutions. In particular, on April 5-6, both countries conducted preparations of their forces in case of a strike from Iran in response to the death of high-ranking officers of the Iranian special services in Syria from an Israeli air strike.

Big Geopolitics

Actually, such logic may well be present in Washington’s actions regarding Ukraine. Because at the level of big geopolitics, a pragmatic approach always prevails, which includes room for agreements and deals. At the same time, the policy of the official Ukrainian authorities today comes from a tougher approach to this conflict. In the most general sense, they want the total defeat of Russia, at least, to defeat its army on the battlefield and regain all occupied territories. But from the pragmatic point of view of the same Americans, it is more important not to let Russia win. Especially since after the end of the war or even just its freezing, all sanctions against Russia will remain, which is not very beneficial from the point of view of the interests of its economy.

In this perspective, any proposed agreements, as well as the freezing of the conflict, are perceived in Kyiv as the impossibility of achieving the stated goals. Naturally, the same attitude applies to the possible scenario of exchanging Ukrainian territories for NATO membership.

For Kyiv, this is obviously unacceptable. While for the USA, it can be considered as a quite pragmatic approach.

For example, in Israel, the authorities want a complete rout of Hamas and are ready to agree that this will lead to a humanitarian disaster for the civilian population of the Gaza Strip. But for the USA, relations with the Arab world as a whole are important. If we look at the situation in particular, then for the Biden administration on the eve of the upcoming elections, the votes of Muslim and left-leaning voters are important.

Actually, in relation to Ukraine, despite all the corresponding rhetoric, the USA and the West as a whole proceed from more global and pragmatic approaches, which cannot but worry the Ukrainian authorities, who naturally have a different attitude to what is happening. Meanwhile, there are more and more signals that big countries want, if not to end this conflict, then at least to freeze it.

Instruments of Pressure

In this context, it is worth considering all the leaked information, such as the deal to exchange territories for NATO membership. Obviously, all this is not serious. But this is done not for the sake of a real result, but to put pressure on an uncooperative partner. It is very indicative that on April 4, during the conversation between the defense ministers of Russia and France, Sergei Shoigu and Sebastien Lecornu, which, according to the French, was quite «rude,» the Russian minister unexpectedly mentioned the Istanbul agreements of 2022. Although previously in Russia they said that their conditions were no longer relevant.

In this sense, it is very interesting that at the end of February 2024, The Wall Street Journal just published a draft agreement between Russia and Ukraine following the negotiations in Istanbul in April 2022. One might wonder why, actually, publish this document right now? It is already history and should be interesting precisely in this context. At the same time, neither Ukraine nor Russia published this document after the negotiations failed. They had no particular interest in it then. For Ukraine, because its representatives negotiated extremely unfavorable conditions. For Russia, because they were ready to end the war and even agree to discuss the status of the DPR and LPR.

According to this document, Ukraine was to permanently maintain a neutral status, that is, never join NATO, and the Russian language was to be used in official circulation along with Ukrainian. At the same time, Crimea was to remain under Russian control, but Ukraine could formally disagree with the recognition of this fact.

The status of those territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were not under Ukrainian control at the time before the start of the war in February 2022 was to be discussed by the presidents of the two countries during personal negotiations. All other occupied territories of Ukraine were to be left by Russian troops.

In this document, what is interesting is actually not even the somewhat unclear desire of Moscow to make Ukraine’s accession to NATO impossible and to strengthen the position of the Russian language. The most curious thing is the discussion of the number of armed forces that Ukraine was allowed to have according to this agreement. Undoubtedly, the very fact of such restrictions is already an important sign of the loss of state sovereignty.

Historical Analogies

Moscow allegedly insisted on 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery pieces. In addition, any foreign weapons were prohibited. In turn, Kyiv supposedly demanded to keep 250,000 soldiers, 800 tanks, and 1,900 artillery pieces.

It is characteristic that this discussion, if it really took place, very much resembles the relations of Ukrainian Cossacks with Poland during the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the 17th century.

At that time, Poland granted the status of registered Cossacks to some Cossacks on the border with the steppes of the Black Sea region. In exchange for border service, they received some self-government, exemption from taxes, the right to land, and partly monetary and food maintenance. But usually, it was not paid, instead, the Cossacks freely disposed of the land on the border and did not pay taxes. In the conditions of 17th-century Poland, this was very profitable. Therefore, there were many who wanted it, dependent peasants fled to the border to escape exploitation.

Initially, there were 6-8 thousand registered Cossacks. During uprisings against Polish authority, the local Orthodox population demanded the expansion of the number of registered Cossacks. Against the background of the Cossacks’ victories, the Zboriv Peace of 1649 between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Bohdan Khmelnytsky defined the register at 40,000. After their defeat at Berestechko in 1651, it was reduced to 20,000. Given that many rebellious peasants joined the Cossacks, naturally, there was not enough registry for everyone. When the treaty with the Moscow state was signed in Pereyaslav in 1654, the registry was increased to 60,000 Cossacks. But due to the actual autonomy of the Hetmanate, it was never maintained.

In essence, the agreement of April 15, 2022, if it was really discussed, effectively took us back to the era of the registered Cossacks. Then Ukraine, or rather Ukrainian Cossacks, argued about the number of allowed armed forces with a neighboring more powerful state, that time with Poland.

If at the end of February 2024, «The Wall Street Journal» publishes this interesting document, and in early April of the same year, the Russian Defense Minister mentions it, this allows us to talk about practically a dialogue or at least its reflection in the public space if it is confidential. Moreover, in this dialogue, influential intermediaries are clearly actively involved. First and foremost, these are China and Turkey.

Influential Intermediaries

Perhaps, this is why Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan took the defeat of his party in the municipal elections so calmly because he is now focused on foreign policy. Here, Turkey traditionally plays an important role in relations between Russia and Ukraine, one can recall the same Istanbul agreements, as well as the grain deal.

On April 4, 2024, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin, when asked about Ukraine, stated that «in a political settlement, there should be no winners or losers.»

China’s position at the time was expressed in a 12-point plan published on February 23, 2023. Although there were many declarative moments in it, China’s position was quite clearly expressed in several points.

In the first point, it stated «respect for the sovereignty, guarantee of independence, and territorial integrity of all countries.» That is, the basis of the negotiations was supposed to be a rejection of annexations. At the same time, the third point provided for a ceasefire. According to the fourth point, peace negotiations were to begin.

In essence, this meant freezing the conflict. If the territorial integrity of Ukraine is formally recognized, while hostilities cease and negotiations begin, then this is precisely the Korean scenario of 1953. The parties remain with their own, but no longer fight. Negotiations, however, can go on indefinitely. For example, the Korean conflict has not officially ended to this day.

Korean Scenario

In Beijing, they clearly know what they are talking about, because China was an active participant in those events. At the final stage of the war in Korea, «Chinese volunteers» made up to 80% of the armed forces on the side of North Korea.

Then events developed rapidly.

On March 5, Joseph Stalin died in the USSR.

On March 28, North Korean Prime Minister Kim Il Sung and the commander of the Chinese volunteers, Peng Dehuai, agreed to negotiate a truce and exchange of prisoners. South Korean President Syngman Rhee categorically refused to participate in negotiations that envisaged the de facto division of the country and the abandonment of northern territories. In response, the USA threatened to withdraw troops. Under pressure from the Americans, Syngman Rhee conceded.

On July 27, 1953, an armistice was signed in Panmunjom. The border was drawn along the front line. However, there is still no peace treaty between North and South Korea.

It is characteristic that in March 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin, after meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, stated that «many points of the Chinese peace plan can be taken as the basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Ukraine in the future when the West and Ukraine are ready for it.»

It should be noted that in Ukraine, any negotiations with Russia have been legislatively banned, which is constantly emphasized by Russian representatives as the main obstacle to finding a peaceful settlement.

Positional War

Of course, the Russian president counted on another point in the Chinese plan, which provided for the unilateral lifting of sanctions. But it is clear that this is unfeasible. If the war stops, the possible lifting of sanctions will be the subject of negotiations, which can go on for a very long time. In exchange for their lifting, the West may demand concessions of territories.

In this situation, Russia also faces many questions in connection with the ongoing war. Although it undoubtedly holds the military initiative, it has no strategic prospects for continuing the war.

Slowly pushing through the Ukrainian defense in the conditions of a positional war clearly cannot ensure a breakthrough in the war.

Even if Ukraine currently lacks soldiers, weapons, and ammunition, it is obvious that this will not always be the case. The West, in any case, will not let it lose.

They may not provide as much weaponry as needed for an offensive to retake the territories occupied by Russia, but it will certainly be enough for defense.

Overall, at this stage of the war, Russia has a tactical advantage. This is due to the obvious superiority in weapons. While Ukraine’s position is affected by its dependence on foreign weapons supplies. They have been reduced mainly because the US Congress, due to internal contradictions, cannot resolve the issue of funding Ukraine in the amount of $60 billion. Therefore, in 2024, the supply of American weapons from the US to Ukraine has sharply decreased. In addition, Europe could not fulfill the plans to produce 1 million 155-mm caliber shells for their supply to Ukraine by March 2024.

In March, Ukrainian representatives said that on the front, the Russian army makes 6 artillery shots against 1 shot by the Ukrainians. Western media wrote that today Russia can produce from 2.5 to 3.5 million shells per year. At the same time, at the end of February, the South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said that North Korea supplied about 3 million shells to Russia. Actually, the superiority in artillery power played its role in the fact that the Russian army is advancing, and the Ukrainian one is defending. As a result, the Ukrainians lost their base in Avdiivka, which they had been fortifying since 2014.

At the end of March, it was announced that since the beginning of 2024, Russian troops have occupied 100 square kilometers of territory. Although this is not such an impressive result, but in the conditions of a positional war, it may be significant, especially in a situation of ongoing exhaustion of the forces of the active armies. This is true for both Russia and Ukraine.

Problem of Personnel

When the number of professional and motivated soldiers among volunteers decreases at the front, mobilized soldiers begin to prevail. As a result, the overall stability of the army may decrease, especially against the background of fatigue from a positional war. For example, this happened in 1917 in the army of the Russian Empire. It lost its professional composition in battles in 1914-1916, and mobilized peasants and workers did not want to fight.

Although at the beginning of 1917, Russia no longer had problems with weapons as at the beginning of the war, it had 18 million artillery shells in reserve. But the army of civilians was huge and at the same time poorly motivated to continue the war. The mutiny of military personnel from reserve battalions played a decisive role in the February Revolution. A year later, in 1918, the German army refused to fight. Soldiers massively surrendered, naval sailors in the rear rebelled.

At the same time, neither in Russia nor in Germany was the situation so critical at that point. In this sense, a positional war with massive armies of mobilized civilians is especially dangerous for the authorities of the warring states. It depletes resources, primarily the most trained and motivated soldiers.

At the same time, it weakens the state’s monopoly on violence because millions of civilians are under arms. To control them, the state needs extraordinary efforts.

For example, in World War II in the USSR, the most severe measures were used for this purpose. In particular, the number of deserters was 1.7 million people, 2.5 million were considered evaders. One million people were convicted for desertion, more than 200,000 were shot, and the rest were sent to the front. This does not include those who were shot without trial and investigation by barrier troops and SMERSH (Death to Spies) organs at the front.

In World War I, the warring states did not have such powerful control systems over the warring army as the USSR in World War II. But the latter are only possible with a highly centralized power and require a fundamentally different organization of the state and society.

Mobilization Issues

Modern war is more reminiscent of World War I. At least because all parties to the conflict have a market economy. Overall, both in Ukraine and in Russia, decisions about additional mobilization are very difficult to make, of course, for different reasons. It is especially difficult for the Ukrainian side. It is clear that in a democracy, even during a war, it is not easy to make unpopular decisions, and mobilization is clearly one of them. The Verkhovna Rada has been considering the relevant law for quite some time.

In Russia, this is easier, as the decree of President Vladimir Putin from 2022 is still in effect. But the call-up of a large number of people creates difficulties with their armament and training. But there is also the problem of increasing the number of unmotivated civilians in the army. Instead of combat units, one can get conditional rifle regiments, something like an armed militia or a militia.

Even if one does not consider risks similar to those in the Russian Empire in 1917 and in Germany in 1918, there are still questions about the effectiveness of such an army, especially for breaking through the defense.

But still, neither Russia nor Ukraine has an alternative to conducting mobilization, not only if they intend to achieve a breakthrough on the front but also to continue the positional war in the current format. Because it is obvious that with the current forces, they are clearly not able to win in the existing conditions of a positional war. They need reinforcements and more weapons for them, especially to advance.

Because defending in a modern war is still easier even in conditions of a reduction in the number of professional and volunteer parts of the army. For example, Ukraine claims that it will be able to hold out even in a situation of reduced arms supplies from the West. On March 29, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky said that without US support,

«we will retreat, step by step, in small steps.»

Although this is a political statement aimed at demonstrating to Western politicians the difficulty of the situation in which Ukraine finds itself, it still has the ability to conduct defensive battles with its existing forces while maintaining certain support from Europe.

Air War

It is logical that the Russian army strives to use the tactically advantageous situation when the Ukrainian army so obviously lacks weapons. Moreover, besides artillery, it has been able to bring bomber aviation back to the battlefield.

In the previous period of the war, it was not able to operate freely along the front line and strike Ukrainian troops. This was due to the fact that in February-March 2022, the Ukrainians were able to save their air defense from strikes by Russian aviation.

The situation for Russian front-line aviation worsened when Ukraine received Western air defense systems.

But by the winter of 2023-24, Russia began to actively use guided aerial bombs (KABs). A special model was attached to a regular bomb, and it could glide from the drop point, which could be 40-50 kilometers from the front line. Such bombs were very inaccurate, but there were a lot of them, they were left from the times of the USSR, they were cheap and at the same time contained much more explosives than missiles. The Russian army uses bombs weighing 250, 500, 1000, and 1500 kilograms. They can have enormous destructive power. The fall of Avdiivka was made possible in large part due to their use.

In turn, the Ukrainian army, trying to find a countermeasure to such tactics, took a serious risk and moved its air defense systems closer to the front line, including the American «Patriot». In February, they managed to shoot down several Russian Su-34 bombers. In addition, Ukrainian air defense shot down two long-range airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft A-50U during the past winter. This was supposed to seriously weaken the observation system of the battlefield.

Although the price of this success was the destruction of several Ukrainian air defense systems, including apparently even one «Patriot». Nevertheless, after the February losses, Russian planes began to carry out fewer bombings with KABs. This may be related to their concerns about Ukrainian air defense. Although their role could also be played by the fact that KABs are very inaccurate and it is not easy for them to find targets. For example, the Avdiivka fortified area was a large target.

City War

But there is another side to the coin. Lately, it seems, a full-fledged «city war» has begun. In this sense, the parties, so to speak, are following the logic of the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. The transition to positional warfare then led to Tehran and Baghdad beginning mutual shelling of cities. Of course, they did not have the capabilities that are available in the modern war between Russia and Ukraine. But the shelling continued for quite a long time and ended due to the depletion of missile weapons reserves.

Of course, in this war, the Russian army often shelled Ukrainian cities. Cities on the front line in Eastern Ukraine — Mariupol, Avdiivka, Maryinka, and others — were heavily damaged. In addition, Russia could strike across the entire depth of Ukrainian territory. In particular, in the winter of 2022-2023, Russia bombed energy infrastructure facilities with missiles and kamikaze drones.

At the same time, Ukraine may have had some unwritten restrictions regarding strikes deep into Russian territory. For example, it is believed that Western countries do not allow Ukraine to use its long-range missiles against targets on Russian territory, except for those that are de jure Ukrainian. This is partly why Germany does not transfer long-range «Taurus» missiles to Ukraine.

Although one of the reasons cited was also Berlin’s reluctance to send specialists to Ukraine for their use. Apparently, without them, Ukrainians would not be able to use these missiles.

At the same time, Ukraine has learned to produce drones, including analogs of Iranian kamikaze drones «Shahed,» which Russia uses under the brand «Geran.» Ukrainian drones, including the «Shahed» analog called «Luty,» strike Russian military and industrial targets up to 1000 or more kilometers deep.

Since the beginning of 2024, they have hit a dozen oil refineries and oil terminals. As a result, the production of petroleum products in Russia has reportedly decreased by 12-15%. On April 2, Ukrainian drones attacked the farthest target for them, 1200 kilometers away in Tatarstan.

But there was another limitation of this war, which was related to the border line.

The Great Front

When the Russian army withdrew from the Kiev, Sumy, and Chernihiv regions in the spring of 2022, and from the northern part of the Kharkiv region in the autumn of the same year, the border between the two countries returned to its previous state, yet it did not become a frontline. It is understood that both sides kept some troops there as a precaution, erected defensive structures, and mined dangerous areas. However, active military operations did not occur here, except for the actions of sabotage groups. Furthermore, a checkpoint for peaceful citizens operates here, and prisoner exchanges were conducted.

It is possible that in 2022, for some reasons, the parties did not want the conflict to escalate into a full-fledged war. It can also be assumed that they simply did not have the troops for such a war at that time. Currently, the frontline spans approximately 1300 kilometers. According to Western media reports, there may be half a million Russian soldiers there, and possibly a slightly smaller number of Ukrainian soldiers. It is clear that in the spring of 2022, both sides had fewer troops. If the frontline also passed through the Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv regions, this would add an additional 500-600 kilometers to it.

Thus, in 2022, Russia and Ukraine would have needed at least an additional 50-100 thousand soldiers each for the new front, along with a corresponding amount of equipment and weapons. Moreover, this would have increased the unpredictability of the situation on the frontline. In the middle of 2022, Ukraine had a certain advantage due to many motivated soldiers and their greater readiness for maneuverable warfare. One can recall the operation in Balakliia.

Furthermore, at that time, a significant limitation for Russia was that military actions would directly affect Russian territory. For the domestic political agenda, this would have been rather inconvenient. As long as the war was waged on Ukrainian territory, for the majority of the Russian population, it could remain classified as a military operation outside its borders.

However, at the end of 2022, Russia held referendums in the territories of four regions and declared their annexation. As a result, the battles are still taking place on the territory it considers its own. However, in the public consciousness of Russia, these regions are still not considered entirely Russian. Therefore, nothing particularly changed; the fighting continued in the conditionally new territories, while the former Russia remained, as it were, outside the zone of military operations.

Approximately 500 kilometers of the border between Russia and Ukraine in the areas of the Ukrainian Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv regions remained mostly outside the zone of active combat for the majority of this war by default. They bordered the Russian Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod regions. Such a situation can be attributed to the specificity of this war, which in Russia is still referred to as a special military operation.

It should be noted that the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod gas pipeline passes through this area, through which Russian gas has been supplied through Ukraine to Europe throughout the years of the war. However, Ukraine has stated that it will not renew the contract for the transit of Russian gas to Europe after its expiration at the end of 2024. But for now, it continues to be fulfilled.

Russia’s Offensive

However, this winter, the situation on the front has changed. Russia took Avdiivka and continued to advance on several fronts. At the same time, Ukraine encountered difficulties not only with weapons but also with defense lines. It turned out that they were not prepared in the rear. The Russian troops were able to be stopped after the loss of Avdiivka with the help of the most elite units and the most motivated volunteer formations.

Against this background, certain contradictions began to emerge within Ukrainian politics. In early February 2024, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army, Valeriy Zaluzhny, was sent into retirement. The representative of the Ukrainian president’s office, Mykhailo Podoliak, said that this was partly due to the need to reconsider the tactics on the battlefield and to prevent stagnation. Such a reproach towards the former commander-in-chief was made because he was not motivated to advance.

Earlier, on November 1, 2023, Zaluzhny wrote an article in «The Economist,» where he noted that the war was transitioning into a positional stage and to get out of this situation, several tasks needed to be solved. Among them were achieving air superiority, improving electronic warfare, counter-battery warfare, demining, and expanding conscription.

Overall, everything Zaluzhny said is quite logical, although there are questions about whether such an article by a high-ranking military official is appropriate during a war. However, reading between the lines, Zaluzhny essentially called into question Kiev’s official position. Of his points, only conscription can be considered an internal task. Everything else depends on the supplies from the West, and in such volumes that are essentially unattainable.

The Pragmatic View

For example, it is quite obvious that Ukraine will in no way be able to achieve air superiority over Russia. To do so, it would require not just two dozen F-16 fighter-bombers, but at least two or three hundred with all the accompanying weaponry. It is clear that the West will not be able to meet such a request. If the US has only supplied 30 «Abrams» tanks despite having several thousand in storage, why would they support the supply of 300 F-16s?

The aircraft may be Danish or Dutch, but American assistance in this case is related to the supply of missiles and overall support for their use. Counter-battery warfare would also require not so much more artillery as it would more projectiles. Even with all the strain on the industrial capabilities of Europe and the US, they will only be able to reach the necessary level of production in three to four years. Currently, according to CNN information from March 11, Europe and the US together can produce 1.2 million 155mm projectiles per year. For comparison, Russia produces 3 million 152mm projectiles per year.

So why did Zaluzhny voice essentially unrealistic plans? On the one hand, this could follow the logic of including as much as possible in the request. On the other hand, by doing so, the acting commander-in-chief at the time effectively cast doubt on the political line of official Kiev.

Recall that it was based on the need to return to the 1991 borders as the main condition for possible negotiations. In his article, Zaluzhny essentially noted that this is impossible within the resources available to Ukraine. Although he also stated that the return to the 1991 borders remains the goal of this war.

This was the sober view of a pragmatist on the situation of this war. However, it was also a political view, which could not have pleased the political leadership of Ukraine.

In late November 2023, «The Economist» wrote that the relationship between the president and the commander-in-chief remained extremely tense. Ultimately, this led to Zaluzhny’s retirement in early February 2024. A New Front

Soon after, on February 16, Ukrainian forces left Avdiivka. It was at this time that Ukraine began to change its tactics in combat. On February 15, the Russian city of Belgorod was heavily shelled. From that moment on, the shelling of this city has been ongoing. Ukraine uses the Czech VM-70 «Vampire» multiple rocket launcher system for this purpose.

Belgorod became the first major Russian city to find itself in such a situation. Prior to this, Ukraine primarily targeted military and industrial facilities or oil storage facilities in Russia and used drones for this purpose. However, the shelling of Belgorod with rocket artillery led to the emergence of a new trend. It is clear that Ukrainian cities have been under fire for two years now, and from the perspective of Ukrainian public opinion, shelling Belgorod is logical. Although Russian public opinion undoubtedly does not think so.

In this case, one should look at the situation from a pragmatic point of view. Why did the Ukrainian authorities decide to significantly escalate the situation from February 2024 onwards? They shifted to active operations precisely in the direction where, by default since the beginning of the war, there had been no active combat.

Of course, Russian troops periodically shelled the border city of Kharkiv and some other cities. But it was still far from the situation in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Essentially, it could be about opening a new front.

It is characteristic that in March 2024, formations of the so-called Russian Volunteer Corps, the Legion of Russian Freedom, and the Siberian Battalion entered the territory of the Belgorod region. These are different groups of Russian nationals who are fighting on the side of Ukraine.

The Russian Volunteer Corps consists of Russian ultra-rightists, the Siberian Battalion includes representatives of national minorities, and the Legion of Russian Freedom includes those who are close to former State Duma deputy Ilya Ponomarev. However, there are not too many of them, and their previous forays into Russia were considered the activities of sabotage groups. In March, real battles with the use of tanks, artillery, and even aviation were taking place in the Belgorod region.

It is clear that this would have been impossible without significant support from the Ukrainian side. But formally, Russian citizens were fighting, although everyone understood. In this conflict since 2014, such things often happen; one can recall the arms trade.

Apparently, by opening a new front, the Ukrainians wanted to solve several tasks at once. Primarily, they clearly sought to create image problems for the Russian authorities in connection with the presidential elections in Russia on March 15-17. But perhaps more importantly for them was to compel the Russian command to transfer some reserves to the Belgorod direction. Especially since, in addition to Belgorod, the Kursk and Bryansk regions also border Ukraine.

It is clear that even the hypothetical possibility of the prospect of starting active combat operations here by Russian volunteers or not only them could not but cause concern in Moscow. Therefore, some reserves were directed to Belgorod. This was necessary to neutralize the actions of a relatively serious group that had come from the territory of Ukraine under the flag of Russian opposition groups and, in general, to cover the border in case the attack could be more extensive.

For Russia, the incursions of proxy groups from Ukraine into the Belgorod region, the need to engage in combat there, and the regular shelling of this city by Ukrainians created significant problems. The complexity of the situation was that there was no obvious plan for how to react to the changing situation.

If tanks and more serious military forces entered Russia from Ukrainian territory in March, even under the flag of certain Russian opposition groups, what could prevent Ukraine from scaling up this experience?

Therefore, now Russia must consider the risk of opening a new front in the Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod regions. This is not to mention the image losses from the fact that the war has come to Russian territory. In any case, it now needs to increase its forces on the southern border with Ukraine.

But at the moment, this can only be done by redeploying troops from eastern Ukraine or using reserves intended to support the ongoing offensive. But this would mean weakening or even halting the offensive.

The problem also lies in the fact that the Russian command does not know the true intentions of the Ukrainian army, what it plans to do on this previously secondary front. And if that is unknown, then one must prepare for a more severe scenario, which would require the transfer of some significant force to ensure a troop strength of 40-50 thousand people, perhaps more.

However, for Moscow, the difficulty here is that perhaps this is a false move on the part of Kiev? If the Ukrainians are luring Russian troops away from the front in this way? Perhaps they do not actually intend to advance, but are creating a threat to which Russia must react. The Russian command will withdraw troops from the active front line, deploy them along the border with Ukraine, and nothing will happen. Ukrainian troops will not cross the border.

Moreover, theoretically, for two years, Ukrainians should have been preparing to defend the border zone near their northern border. Of course, there are known problems with building defensive lines on the front line in Donbass. But there, they were planning to advance, not defend. It is noteworthy that at the beginning of the year, Kyiv allocated funds for the construction of defensive structures, and a significant portion of them were for the northern direction. At that time, everyone wondered why build fortifications where there is no war and where fortifications theoretically should have been built two years ago.

It can be assumed that strengthening the defense of the northern direction by Ukraine precisely created the conditions for the tactics it is using today. The Russian army will have to create a force along its southern borders with Ukraine, but it will be insufficient to break through the defenses. At the same time, it cannot fail to create such a force because the Ukrainians may continue to use the tactic of organizing raids by large proxy forces on Russian territory. After these raids, they withdraw behind the fortified lines on the border.

This is somewhat reminiscent of the tactics of the Hussite wars in Europe. When infantry was in a wagon fort, and cavalry would come out from under its cover, strike, and then retreat back into the fortification of battle wagons. The most important thing in this case is not so much the quality of the infantry. The soldiers of the legendary Czech commander Jan Žižka came from poor Czech peasants and successfully fought against the knights of all Europe.

Of course, any analogies are conditional. But the Ukrainian army, behind prepared lines of echeloned defense, theoretically can pose a threat to Russian territories, for example, with the same proxy groups. At the same time, for Russia to solve this situation, it is not enough to simply keep troops on the border. This is disadvantageous because a significant contingent of troops will be tied up with the need to worry about the threat from Ukraine.

In this situation, it is likely that the topic of a possible new Russian offensive on Kharkiv and possibly even Kyiv arose in the public space. In March, this was actively discussed in the media at various levels. Military analysts say this is unlikely. Not only because there are no signs of the concentration of any significant troop groups on the hypothetical Kharkiv direction. For such a military operation, more soldiers are needed than for neutralizing possible attacks from proxy groups from Ukrainian territory.

In particular, opinions were expressed that it would be necessary to concentrate up to 100-150 thousand troops with the corresponding armaments for this. Although the BBC wrote in early April about 300 thousand soldiers. This is a lot, and even mobilization in this case will not help much. Because these would be more like militia or insurgent formations, consisting mainly of light infantry. It will be difficult for them to break through staggered defense. Moreover, they are unlikely to be able to use the territory of Belarus, as in February 2022, which limits maneuverability. They will have to storm prepared defense lines head-on.

It is more likely that the idea of a possible advance on Kharkiv serves as a means of informational pressure. For example, to force Ukraine to also transfer some troops to the north to neutralize a possible offensive.

It is also important to note here that Russia needs to find some response to the situation in Belgorod and the attacks on oil refineries. In this case, they are using different options. This includes intensified shelling of Ukraine. In particular, during a series of missile strikes at the end of March, many objects of the energy infrastructure were destroyed. Among them are all the thermal power plants of Kharkiv, several other thermal power plants, and DniproHES was seriously damaged.

This creates a difficult situation for Ukraine. Although energy supply has been partially restored, thanks to supplies of electricity from Europe. Of course, if such a strike had been made in winter, it would have had more serious consequences.

But in winter, Ukraine did not yet have a shortage of the same air defense missiles. Moreover, last winter, Russia attacked energy facilities significantly less frequently than in the winter of 2022-2023. Many then concluded that it is very difficult to damage power plants built back in the Soviet era. The main damage that winter was done to transformers, which Ukrainians regularly repaired. And now such a massive strike in March 2024.

Among analysts, there were opinions that in this way Russia is trying to avoid the need to storm the border and attack Kharkiv, but wants to force its residents to emigrate to increase the burden on European countries. Especially since this city is regularly bombed by the same UAVs. More than a million people live here, and in case of intensified bombing, many of them may leave the city due to lack of electricity and water.

In connection with all this, the question arises, why did Ukraine then escalate the situation on its northern border with Russia? Especially since Moscow clearly could not leave unanswered shelling of Belgorod and attacks by proxy groups on the eponymous region. Given the proximity of Kharkiv to the border, it would have been logical to intensify not just its shelling, but also UAV bombings?

Of course, there is the same aforementioned military logic to draw some of the Russian troops away from the active front. But its application against the backdrop of all possible risks may indicate not so much the flexibility of tactical maneuvering by forces and means, but a really complex situation on the front.

In any case, Kyiv is seriously at risk. They will not be able to withstand the intensification of bombings of border cities, especially Kharkiv. Moreover, in Russia, President Putin said in March that it might be necessary to create a sanitary zone on the territory of Ukraine to prevent shelling of Russian cities. Then everyone thought about an offensive, but if it’s not about that, but rather about intensifying bombings.

It can be assumed that there are certain contradictions within the Ukrainian elite regarding the nature of this war. Recent dismissals are likely related to this. In addition to the former commander Zaluzhny, on March 26, Secretary of the Security Council Alexei Danilov was dismissed, and then on March 30, advisor to President Zelensky, Sergei Shefir, and several other non-staff advisors.

Such reshuffles at the highest levels of power clearly indicate President Zelensky’s desire to change certain algorithms of his policy. Given that all the aforementioned individuals were in power during the most difficult moments of this war, therefore, the question is not about their loyalty. This may be about different positions on some key and very important issue.

At the moment, what could be the most important?

It is the attitude towards the possible freezing of the conflict and the position of Ukraine’s Western allies associated with it. Actually, among the dismissed Ukrainian officials, Zaluzhny very clearly expressed his position in his article. Basically, he does not believe in the possibility of victory without increasing Western assistance, and since there is no such possibility, then one should follow their recommendations.

It can be assumed that Danilov, Shefir, and others expressed similar views in private conversations. But President Zelensky is clearly not ready to agree with this. He hopes to still persuade the West to agree with his position, which excludes freezing the war. He wants the West to support the idea of ​​conducting the war, if not to complete victory, then at least to the liberation of part of the Ukrainian territories. And if someone in the corridors of Ukrainian power suddenly talks about freezing, to some extent reflecting the opinion of the West, then for Zelensky this is obviously unacceptable. This is largely why he is likely to raise the stakes in this war.

In turn, the West offers Ukraine a post-war reconstruction program of about $1 trillion. Including frozen Russian assets in the West could be used for this. In this sense, it is characteristic that Republicans are promoting the idea of ​​providing assistance to Ukraine in the form of a loan specifically secured by Russian assets.

Naturally, Moscow is extremely negative about this idea. At the same time, it is also criticized by countries of the Global South — Saudi Arabia, India, China. They talk about the risks to the stability of the global financial system and possible problems for globalization and world trade. Moreover, no one can prevent the West from making such a decision. Moreover, we do not know what is being discussed in the corridors. But in any case, everyone would like to avoid the radicalization of the war with intensified shelling, new flows of refugees, etc.

It seems that everything is clearly heading towards a conditional Korean scenario. Let us remind you that at that time, President Lee Syngman was against a ceasefire and fixing the front line as the actual border. But that time, in addition to the threat of Americans withdrawing troops from South Korea, there were also intensified attacks by «Chinese volunteers» on South Korean units, which demonstrated the weakness of their military position. Perhaps today we are witnessing a similar scenario.