The latest developments in Russia, inclusive of PMC Wagner’s armed confrontation, occupation of Rostov by same and Yevgeny Prigozhin’s declaration of intention to march on Moscow, created a fundamentally new situation – new not only for Russia. On one side, possible consequences and implications of that attempted coup may cardinally change the course of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian armed confrontation. From the tactical point of view, the conflict weakens the Russian Armed Forces an paves the way for the Ukrainian counter-offensive. From strategic perspective, the situation appears far more complicated. The successful coup may result in more decisive mobilization of the Russian human resources for war, likewise it happened during the assault on Bahmut, or it may imply sooner achievement of mutual agreement.

On the other side, the riot may render its influence upon the global geopolitics, especially because of Prigozhin’s latest sentiments about necessity for Russia to transform into the Soviet-style mobilizational economy. Attempts to materialize that mean Russia’s subsequent isolation, just in the spirit of the North Korea. Besides, that can trigger more robust repressive policy – in the form of mass repressions. Another important circumstance hereto is connected with Prigozhin’s interests in Africa and Middle East. Successful coup means activization of Russia in a good dozen of African countries with the potential of dragging them into the orbit of Russia’s full control. When that happens, that will be a nuclear state, not a private army acting there.

In all cases, the attempted coup exposed the obvious crisis of the central power in Russia. The thing is that when Kremlin endorsed the formation of the Wagner Private Military Company, Moscow, thereby, exposed to risks its own right to resort to violence. And the Russian leadership is now being challenged by a private military formation totaling some two conventional divisions. Prigozhin reported that he ha 15 thousand rifles. That is not a solid body-mass for a long war, but that is a way too numerous group to attempt to take over the power in the country. Especially, considering the fact, that that body-mass is commanded by someone very decisive and robust. In a situation like this, the taking of the central machine of statehood defines almost all. 

In connection with above, we can draw a historic example – the Kornilov Riot of August 1918. It was then, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Imperial Armed Forces decided to establish the military dictatorship in Russia. In doing so, he intended to suppress, in one impact, all liberals and social-democrats, as well as stop liberalization of Russia, bring Russia back to order and then resume armed confrontation with Germany. Kornilov insisted that the Russian chaos was caused by liberalization in the rear-front and that resulted in the weakening of the armed forces, lack of discipline and the situation, in which whole regiments would refuse to assault. He also argued that the armed forces were betrayed by the central government headed by Alexander Kerenskiy.

Kornilov dispatched the 3^rd Mounted Corps and two regiments of the Savage Division (the Ingush and the Cherkes Regiments) on the capital city – Petrograd. On 21 August 1917, German troops occupied Riga. On 25 August, members of the Government from the Cadette Party declared their resignation and support of stronger power in the person of Kerenskiy. On 26 August, Kerenskiy declared that Kornilov was a rioter. In his turn, Kornilov accused Kerenskiy and his government, as well as Bolsheviks of secret agreements with German. He said that – “Conventional Government, acting pressure from Bolsheviks, are killing the army and shaking the country from inside…”.

Kornilov had his own small army — Kornilov Regiment, Tekinskaya Brigade comprised of Turkmens and strike-crews comprised of patriotic rifles, but they all were on the frontline.  3^rd Mounted Corps failed to reach Petrograd and its Commander – General Krymov committed a suicide. Meanwhile, Bolsheviks organized their own Red Guards. Also, Bolsheviks enjoyed support from the Petrograd Garrison, soldiers of which formation no longer wanted deployment to the front. With the failure of the Kornilov Riot, the state’s exceptional right to resort to violence became void.  In October, Bolsheviks deposed the Kerenskiy Government.

Today, Prigozhin threatens to march on Moscow. He says he only wants Sergey Shoigu, the Minister of Defense and Alexander Gerasimov, the Chief of General Staff, whom both Prigozhin accuses of all problems, the Russian armed forces are experiencing at war with Ukraine. According to Prigozhin, the Russian President, the Federal Security Service and Rosgvardiya (Interior Army) shall remain, as they are. But who knows, what will happen, if he does make it to Moscow.

In the morning of 24 June, 2023, Prigozhin had talks with the Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and Deputy Chief of General Staff, Vladimir Alexeyev in Rostov.  Taking in account that Rostov was earlier occupied by Wagner PMC, and there already were encounters between Wagnerites and Russian Armed Forces at the time of those talks,  the two officials were, in fact, POWs.  If something of the kind happens in Moscow, that, in fact, will be the power takeover with all due consequences and implications. 

In the present situation, the Russian ruling regime faces one complexity, which is that most combat-capable detachments are in Ukraine. Those detachments are also inclusive of the special troops.  Ukrainians, for example, report, that Russian special forces today are fighting somewhere in the vicinity of Tokmak.  Russian Airborne troops are also there, as well as the 2^nd Tamanskaya Armored Division. In the times of Joseph Stalin, for situations similar to the Wagner Riot today, there were military detachments stationed around Moscow.  NKVD and later Soviet Ministry of Interior had their own detachments capable to confront Armed Forces.  In 1953, when Soviet top leaders organized a conspiracy for the arrest of Lavrentiy Beriya, the Soviet Armed Forces commanded by Zhukov most of all feared confrontation with the troops reporting to the Ministry of Interior.

Today, Moscow is protected by recruits and Rosgvardiya. One big question is whether they will be capable to confront Prigozhin’s war dogs.  However, there always is opportunity to withdraw a part of fighting troops from Ukraine.

In this situation, however, the imperative thing is not the headcount. The imperative thing is the decisiveness of the ruling regime. First steps have already been taken.  Federal Security Service launched an investigation, local authorities are making public declarations condemning the riot, and the Ministry of Defense produced a number of addresses to Wagnerites to “get real”. Prigozhin reported that certain combat helicopters attached the Wagner convoys and were downed.  In the morning of 24 June, President Putin called Prigozhin’s march treason and riot.  Amongst other things, he drew a comparison between the events in 1917 and today’s situation.

Now, the Russian regime has to not only arrest the movement of Wagnerites towards Moscow, but also take some military action in regards to Wagner PMC.  Wagner PMC are, in fact, controlling Rostov, which urban community is the key rear-front supporting Russian operations in Ukraine.  In Rostov, there are many military detachments and warehouses, as well as airdromes with strike aviation.  If Prigozhin settles in and creates a fortified area in the Rostov Region, confronting him will be a lengthy process. 

Should the above happen, continuation of war with Ukraine will become no longer possible.  If Russian Armed Forces Engage Wagner PMC in the Rostov Region, that will cease the logistical processes supporting operations in Luhansk and Donetsk Republics.  Russian troops in Crimea and to the north from Perekop will also face logistical problems. 

If Wagnerites to manage to hold positions in Rostov for some time, Russia will have to withdraw a part of troops from Ukraine.  It will not be possible to re-deploy troops from Crimea, Tokmak and Melitopol. Not only because, that will collapse the Russian operations there.  Because, they will have to carry personnel and machinery through Crimea and Krasnodar. Russia may withdraw troops from Kremennaya and Svatovo, which means leaving occupied Ukrainian territories unattended.

Now, we may reflect on some conspirology considerations.  For example, we might suppose that the real aim of the riot is to make Russia stop the war.  It is not a secret, that Russia is expressing intention to stop the war, but under certain conditions, i.e. Russian will keep the occupied territories and only then will be open for talks.  Ukraine opposes that, saying they will fight until they restore the borderline as at 1991.

De facto, that is the dead-end.  Does Russia need all those occupied territories, considering that maintaining control over them is one big challenge? In this case, the major problem will be to “keep the face” in the best traditions of the Oriental politics.  Russia cannot just leave those lands.  But the worst outcome would be the defeat and shameful withdrawal.  Russian patriots shall never forgive that and the society, in general, will have a negative impression.  The worst-case scenario for Russian ruling regime will be demonstration of weakness.

Or, Russian troops may withdraw because of some circumstances they do not control.  What are those circumstances? A Russian insurgency, for example.  An insurgency that may require withdrawal of the Russian armed forces, because that insurgency is on obstacle curbing the continuation of war, because it disrupts the logistics.

The above, of course, is all about conspirology.  But if the situation is not settled in the nearest day or two, anything could happen.  Prigozhin will make it to Moscow, or will stay in Rostov.  He voiced both options.  In the first case, things are not absolute.  On one side, Russia may take the way of mobilizational economy, repression, mobilization, isolation and more aggressive foreign policy, including references to usage of nuclear arsenals.  On other side, Prigozhin is a businessman with all due implications.  Taking into consideration his statements of 23 June about the reasons, why the war with Ukraine began, it appears that he could go for negotiations and settlement.  But if we multiply his nature of a businessman by all above mentioned factors, it will appear that his actions are nothing, but a full-scale act of international extortion. 

If Prigozhin fails to reach Moscow and stays in Rostov for a week or two, Russian could begin withdrawal of troops from the Zaporizhiye and Kherson regions to Crimea.  Russia will have a more than solid substantiation for that.  Illustrative is President Putin’s 24 June reference to the situation back in 1917, when “they stole our victory from us”.  The story could repeat.  Putin’s hint was more than generous.  On one side, Putin spoke about “stab in the back”, on the other side – about “stolen victory”.

Besides, Prigozhin’s reputation is pretty much demonic these days, after all those brutal executions of runaway mercenaries with sledgehammers, with cellmates mobilized to the fighting ranks and with his declarations of necessity for Russia to resume the regime of the mobilizational economy.  Considering that, the present Russian ruling regime, appears a bit better in the eyes of the West, where leaders have been recently actively discussing necessity and opportunities for the fighting sides to begin negotiations and settlement.

All scenarios are possible, but we are all approaching a certain culmination.  The situation with the war and inside Russia was for long time undefined, without any clear future prospects.  Now there is a certain perspective, although rather vague. The development of events may suddenly slope in any direction and all players are increasing their bets. 

Quite natural in this situation is the analogy to the events of 1917.  We, however, can as well, remind ourselves of another situation from history.  Prigozhin reminds of Belisarios, a legendary war commander in Byzantium of the times of Emperor Justinian.  Belisarios was one of the most effective war commanders of his epoch.  He defeated Persians and suppressed the Nichos Insurgency in Constantinople, conquered North Africa and Italy and defeated Vandals and Goths. The core of his army was comprised of professional warriors on his own payroll.  His small private army was the most effective tool reporting to Justinian.  But the latter always had concerns about Belisarios’s loyalty and feared that he had Imperial ambitions. 

Rome and Byzantium had many war commanders usurping central power.  Belisarios’s difference was his own private army funded by him and no one else. That is why, the Emperor kept him away from the capital city and would limit his resources and powers, as well as balance him with other war commanders.  Justinian was a master of handling potentially dangerous people.  Successes of insurgencies commanded by Roman and Byzantium war commanders were due to the weakness of central power in highly centralized bureaucratic states, not because of their personal characteristics.  In other words, the Russian regime created a problem for itself.  If, of course, to disregard conspirology considerations.  In that case, we should observe the further course of war especially near Crimea.