We continue the 3-part exposition of an essay, written by William Max Mandel in 1942 and published by The Pacific Affairs Magazine.  Below is Part 2.

Cotton as a Tool of Colonization

Surpassing even the policies of colonization in importance was the economic strategy employed in territories of settled agriculture. In these lands, blessed with an irrigation system, cotton had been cultivated since time immemorial.

The Russian regime, consumed by the ambition to control this raw material, constructed a dedicated railway. Originating from the Caspian, this railway expanded almost as rapidly as the Russian military advanced in the region.

The costs of transshipment on the Caspian, coupled with the burgeoning demand for cotton, necessitated the construction of a direct railway across the steppe in the first decade of the 20th century. This railway stretched from Orenburg (Chkalov) in the Southern Urals to the junction with the Trans-Caspian railroad.

Prior to conquest, cotton was an integral part of local culture and crafts, akin to the practices in India, where fabrics were produced locally. Post-conquest, the inundation of cheap, industrially-produced fabrics overwhelmed local markets, obliterating indigenous industries. This compelled cotton farmers to curry favor with Russia.

Russia offered peasants loans at rates of 4% per month and higher. Local peasants, in dire need of cash following the collapse of their artisanal economy under the onslaught of mass-imported manufactures and the pressure from their own beys, were compelled to cultivate cotton.

The Land Debt Bondage

Initial attempts by the Russian administration to establish a plantation-based agricultural economy in the region faltered. Subsequently, they enlisted the support of large landowners.

These landowners either leased small plots to impoverished dehkans or purchased cotton from them. Additionally, they constructed and owned cotton-ginning factories.

The economy rapidly transitioned from self-sufficiency in foodstuffs to being beholden to a single crop. The land area devoted to American cotton varieties expanded from 750 acres in 1884 to 160,000 acres by 1890. However, the relationship between beys and dehkans remained constant.

In fact, it even solidified, as independent dehkans swiftly lost their lands under the prevailing credit policies, becoming tenant farmers.

As in the American South, sharecropping and credit policies aimed at an illiterate peasantry led to widespread impoverishment, as they received scant cash. Nevertheless, the system in Central Asia was more stable and logically coherent, as the majority of sharecroppers were not slaves and were not entirely dispossessed of land. Generally, they retained rights to the plots where their homes and outbuildings stood.

Thus, they perceived themselves as proprietors, their sentiments amplified by religious fidelity and feudal obligations. Moreover, the fact that they worked for their kinfolk in traditional forms created an unyielding wall of traditionalism, nearly impossible to dismantle.

Rising Discontent

The extreme impoverishment of the local indigenous population catalyzed a surge in discontent. The Uzbeks orchestrated minor uprisings in 1885, 1892, 1893, and 1898. In 1904, Russian railway workers formed the first revolutionary groups with clear objectives and goals. In 1905, both Russian and local workers embarked on a general Uzbek strike.

However, the true sentiments of the masses only surfaced during the First World War. Despite its vast population, Russia grappled with a shortage of soldiers and rear echelon workers, a situation exacerbated by colossal personnel losses on the frontlines. In June 1916, the Tsar was compelled to issue a decree for the mobilization of the Central Asian population for rear echelon duties in the active army. The region was expected to contribute 250,000 individuals to the army.

The very attempt to mobilize the local population for service to the despised Tsar fanned the flames of rebellion. Demonstrating utter disregard for the basic rights and needs of these people, the Tsarist administration announced the mobilization at the height of the harvest season.

The Steppe Ablaze

Central Asia erupted. Without a unified organization or plan, but resolved not to leave their native lands for service to the conqueror, the local indigenous population, both settled and nomadic, urban and rural, took up arms to shield their kin from conscription. The revolt began in July and was brutally suppressed by November 1916. As a result of the Tsarist terror, approximately 1 million nomadic Kyrgyz and Kazakhs fled to Xinjiang. Of the planned 250,000, the Tsar managed to muster only 120,000.

The 20th century history accords a unique place to the Central Asian peoples’ uprising against conscription. Regrettably, it remains unrecognized.

In the structure of the Russian monarchy, overthrown a year later, this was the first fissure. The fact that nearly 8 out of the 11 million population participated in some form in creating this structural breach marked the political awakening of a large mass of previously backward population.

The uprising predetermined the local peoples’ inclination towards the Bolsheviks when faced with the choice between the Reds and the Whites, who were vying for the restoration of the monarchy. It also predetermined the nature of the political issues the Bolsheviks later had to address in the region, rooted in the awakened consciousness of the masses, albeit born in the struggle against colonialism and the oppression of Tsarism.

Central Asia and the Provisional Government

The policies of the Provisional Government, which existed from March to November 1917, regarding ending the war, transferring land rights to peasants, and addressing the famine in cities, were unpopular among the masses. The colonial policy of the Provisional Government, compared to the Tsarist regime, was shapeless and inadequate.

This was most evident in relation to the Emirate of Bukhara. The Provisional Government allowed Tsarist advisor Miller to retain his position at the Emir’s court. The Provisional authorities were content with sending a postal message to Miller and the autocratic Emir, urging them to promptly start democratic reforms.

In Kyrgyzstan, the seizure of land, livestock, and property of the indigenous population continued.

The new governments of Turkestan and the Steppe region were a mix of officials from the Tsarist administration, traders—both indigenous and settlers—affluent Russian peasants, and elders of the indigenous population. Neither the Russian railway workers who desired a socialist regime, nor the soldiers in the garrisons suffering from hunger, nor the poor peasants and new settlers were satisfied with the change of power. For them, a close oppressor had simply replaced a distant one. As for the local population, the policy of the new authority differed from the old only in that it was executed in softer language.

Central Asia and the Bolsheviks

With the fall of the Tsarist regime and concurrently with the formation of local organs of the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks established control in some of the railway cities of Russian Turkestan. Central Asia, yearning since the 1916 uprising for the downfall of Tsarism, awaited the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. On September 12, 1917, the Tashkent Soviet declared itself the sole legitimate authority in the region, two months prior to the revolution in the imperial capital.

The forces of the Provisional Government quelled this movement, but within a week after the establishment of Lenin’s government in Petrograd, the Bolsheviks restored their power in Tashkent. Four days of fierce fighting ensued in Tashkent, but the support of the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks from Old Tashkent and nearby villages determined the outcome. Nonetheless, the emirates of Khiva and Bukhara continued to exist for another three years. In Kazakhstan, a nationalist government operated, which was later annihilated.

The Bolsheviks struck two blows against the national state formations. In Central Asia, there was no political party or group that made any attempts to spread its ideology. 19 out of 20 people were illiterate, and the 20th was a representative of the exploitative classes. Meanwhile, Russian workers did not know the local languages.

Soviets appeared in Tashkent, around it, and in the Fergana Valley, where Russian workers were employed in the railway depots. Here, the influence of capitalism on urban life and cotton cultivation was particularly pronounced. In these areas, the Bolsheviks eliminated the most egregious vices, sores, and oversights of the Tsarist regime. They introduced some democratic processes and addressed the basic economic needs and wants of ordinary people, thus securing their support for many years of hardship and uncertainty.

The Steppe and Stalin

Three players vied for public popularity in Central Asia — the Bolsheviks, feudal reactionaries, and the national bourgeoisie. The Bolsheviks’ main striking force was the policy of equality for all nationalities. The feudal lords relied on religion and traditions. The bourgeois nationalists loathed all things Russian.

Central Asia and the Bolsheviks: The Last Two Groups and Stalin

Nevertheless, the last two groups, the feudal reactionaries and the national bourgeoisie, counted among their ranks a number of Russian military personnel who favored the restoration of Tsarist power. Gradually, they united to oppose the Bolsheviks.

The development and implementation of the Bolsheviks’ national policy are inextricably linked to the figure of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. He himself was a native of one of the oppressed peoples of Russia, from a region with one of the most complex spectrums of different religions and ethnic groups — the Caucasus.

Starting in 1912, Stalin became a recognized Bolshevik authority and, moreover, the principal architect of the policy towards the empire’s national minorities. This policy was primarily defined as a means of endowing the peoples of Russia with the right to self-determination, later specified as the right to secede from Russia.

Joseph Stalin joined the Soviet cabinet of ministers as the People’s Commissar for Nationalities Affairs. His first document was the «Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia,» published just a week after the formation of the empire’s new government.

The history of establishing Soviet power in Central Asia can be summarized as a stark contrast, highlighting the vast difference between the wording of the Declaration and how this power was actually established.

Stalin’s Vision

Three years after the beginning of the region’s sovietization, Stalin wrote in the newspaper «Pravda»: «…To solidify the union of peoples, it is foremost necessary to end the exclusion and alienation of the border regions. To stop their descent into a patriarchal way of life and a level of cultural absence. Also to eradicate distrust towards the center, which is perceived in the border regions as a legacy of the cruel policy of Tsarism… We must prove to the indigenous population that we, Central Proletarian Russia, defend their interests and theirs alone. It is necessary to abolish all privileges of Russian colonists. We must let the masses feel the material benefits of the revolution… Such must be demonstrated not only through repressive measures against colonists and bourgeois nationalists but also through a well-thought-out economic policy… Communists on the ground must create universal education to end the illiteracy of the people. Establish closer spiritual ties between the center of Russia and the border regions.»

«We must establish local national schools, national theaters, and national educational institutions. We should elevate the cultural level of the population in the border regions…

In local bodies — courts, administration, economic organs, as well as party organs — wherever possible, staff should be recruited from the indigenous population. They know the customs, traditions, lives, and languages of the indigenous people. The very best representatives of the indigenous nations should be appointed to participate in these bodies…»

Against the backdrop of economic, political, and social backwardness, and in some cases even pre-feudal and patriarchal realities, compounded by civil war and foreign intervention, distrust by some part of the indigenous population, as well as Great Russian chauvinism demonstrated by some representatives of the Soviet authorities, and their complete lack of knowledge of local languages, cultural nuances, and the lifestyle of the indigenous peoples, the Bolsheviks’ national policy was implemented through struggle.

Nevertheless, in this struggle, the Soviets triumphed. The Bolsheviks prevailed because they steadfastly adhered to the principles laid down by Stalin:

• To transfer power to representatives of the indigenous population;
• To involve representatives of all classes willing to work for the new authority in the implementation of national policy;
• To let the people feel the material advantages brought about by the revolution.»

TO BE CONTINUED